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 ABSTRACT 
 
Title: The optimal way to increase cash holdings: From a market perspective - a study of 
various ways to increase cash holdings and their implications on market value during 
economic boom and recession 
Seminar date: 2013-05-29 
Course: FEKN90 
Authors: Ramin Khadem and Patrik Pettersson  
Advisor: Maria Gårdängen 
Keywords: Cash holdings, R&D, CAPEX, Dividends, market value, excess cash 
Purpose: The main purpose of this paper is to identify a relationship between different 
approaches to accumulate cash and companies’ market values between periods of different 
economic conditions. Our thesis contributes with information that helps firm managers decide 
how to increase cash holdings.  
Methodology: Quantitative approach using panel data regressions and cluster analysis. 
Theoretical Perspective: Excess cash holdings, determinants of cash holdings, motives of 
R&D, motives of dividends, motives of CAPEX, agency theory, cost of capital 
Empirical foundation: 1701 U.S. listed firms that existed during 2001-2011 
Conclusions: We come to the conclusion that firms increase their cash holdings by 
decreasing investments in research and development, reduce capital expenditures and 
diminish dividend payments. Further, we also come to the conclusion that the market values 
these cash accumulating approaches differently depending on current economic condition. 
Cuts in dividends are kindly looked upon by the market throughout the periods, meanwhile 
cuts in capital expenditures are most favorable during the crisis and cuts in research and 
development has the least negative impact on the market value in the post crisis years. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter we present the background and problem discussion of the thesis. We also state 
our purpose and question formulation as well as give the reader a brief thesis outline. 
1.1 Background 
At the end of 2007 the world's financial markets were hit by the worst crisis since the great 
depression. When the US housing bubble eventually burst in 2007 it created an uncertainty on 
the global markets that limited borrowing and made the capital markets inaccessible. The 
mistrust between banks created a credit crunch that would limit the ability for firms to finance 
their operations, as well as limit consumers’ ability to purchase products on credit. Suddenly 
no one had any money to spend. (Mizen, 2008) 
A firm’s thoughts regarding liquid assets change in times of financial crisis. This became 
apparent in the 2007-2009 financial crisis when the financial distress costs increased and 
firms had limited access to the credit markets. Gale and Yorulmazer (2011) show that the 
banks cut their lending supply overall and froze the internal lending market between banks 
just in order to strengthen their liquidity positions. If there is any point in time cash, and other 
liquid assets should be more valuable, it is in times of economic crisis. 
There are several reasons for a firm to hold cash and other liquid assets, among others there 
are transaction-, precautionary- and agency cost motives.( Opler, 1999; Jensen, 1976) The 
amount of liquid assets has also proven to be an effective signaling tool, to both possible 
investors as well as creditors, and can therefore impact a firm's ability to raise capital and 
lower the cost this capital will be raised at. (Culp, 2006) 
The financial crisis forced corporate managers to react to a situation more severe than they 
were used to. With a few years retrospect we want to analyze how firms reacted to the new 
reality when it comes to cash holdings, expense management and capital budgeting. We also 
want to find out how the investors rated that reaction by looking at the US stock-markets. Can 
we identify any differences in the firms’ market values based on what they did to their 
expenses (R&D, CAPEX and Dividend) during and after the crisis? 
1.2 Problem discussion 
Song and Lee (2012) concludes that Asian firms increased their cash holdings during and 
after the 1998 Asian financial crisis by decreasing investment expenses. They argue that the 
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reason behind these cuts and cash accumulation was that the market actors’ demand function 
changed due to the crisis. Han and Qui (2007) come to a similar conclusion in their research; 
they conclude that financially constrained firms increase their cash holdings and decrease 
their investment expenses due to the increasing volatility in the firms’ cash flows. Campello, 
Graham and Harveys (2010) survey also continue on this pattern when they show evidence of 
US firms cutting investment expenses during the financial crisis of 2008.  
Even though Simutin’s (2010) research tells us otherwise, that cash is not value creating in 
crisis times, most previous research indicate that firms believe that increased cash holdings 
are important to tackle the market uncertainties during and after a financial crisis. With the 
highly limited access to the restrictive capital markets and external capital, a reallocation 
within the firm is necessary. The most natural expenses to cut would be investments in 
research and development, capital expenditures and dividend payments. But how would cuts 
in these items affect the market’s view of the company? While Pettit (2007) gives plenty of 
reasons to hold cash, researchers like Griliches (1986) and Piergiovanni and Santorelli (2010) 
give us reasons to keep up the above mentioned expenses. This creates a dilemma. While 
there is research that come to the conclusion that the benefit of cash increases during a 
financial crisis and at the same time research that conclude that firms indeed increase their 
cash holdings on behalf of investments there is nothing substantial (to our knowledge) of how 
you can increase cash during a crisis in the, from the investors perspective, optimal way. We 
want to investigate how US firms handled this situation during the financial crisis. Did their 
cash holdings change? If so, did firms change their level of cash holdings by changing their 
capital expenditures, research and development costs or dividend payments? How did the 
market react to these changes? 
 
With the hypothesis, based on the above mentioned literature, that firms do increase their cash 
holdings during a crisis by cutting other expenses we want to see how the market reacts to 
these decisions. What is the optimal way to increase cash holdings during and after a financial 
crisis (from the market’s perspective)? 
1.3 Purpose 
This paper’s main purpose is to analyze cash holdings and expenditure/investment cuts from a 
market’s perspective to see how firms, if needed, can increase their cash holdings by cuttings 
the mentioned items with minimum negative effects on their market value.  
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We want to investigate which expenses the firm reduces when it increases its cash holdings; is 
it R&D expenses, capital expenditures, dividend payments or a mixture of them all? Further 
we want to examine the impact of the cost cutting and if it matters how the firm chooses to 
reduce their expenses considering their market value. Will we see different results? We also 
want to gather the most prominent knowledge in the field of "cash holdings" and create a 
comprehensive overview for the reader to use in future decision-making or research.  
 
We believe that it is of substantial importance for firms to know how the expenditure, 
investment and payout changes they make during a crisis will impact their market value. 
Consequently we also believe that the work would be useful for corporate decision makers in 
future crisis. We combine methods previously used by Opler et al. (1999), Song and Lee 
(2012) and Simutin (2010) for a more complete conclusion of how the firm can increase its 
cash holdings in an, from the markets point of view, optimal way. To our knowledge, there 
has been no previous research with the purpose to show all these results combined.  
1.4 Question formulation 
1. How did US firms’ cash holdings change during and after the economic downturn? 
2. How did the changes in cash holdings impact the capital expenditures, research and 
development and dividend payments during the different periods?  
3. If there was any impact; does the market prefer any particular change over the other and 
do these preferences change depending on the economic condition?   
1.5 Thesis outline 
In Chapter two the literature review can be found where we present previous research in our 
field of work. The literature review is meant to give the reader a good understanding for the 
field and what other researchers have concluded before us. It is categorized as "Cash", 
"Dividends" and "Research and Development and Capital expenditures". Chapter three brings 
up the methodological framework. In this chapter we discuss in detail what we are going to 
do, what sample we used, exclusions and how we secured reliability in our analysis and 
regressions. In Chapter four we finally present our findings in the three steps that our thesis is 
built on. In Chapter five we go on to apply previous literature to our findings and analyze the 
results. In Chapter six we summarize the thesis findings and present a conclusion as well as 
suggestions for further research. 
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2.0 Litterateur Overview 
In this chapter we present previous research that is relevant to our field of work. It is meant 
to give the reader the basic knowledge that we have based this thesis on. The litterateur 
overview is organized into three chapters; "Cash", "Dividends" and "Research and 
Development and Capital expenditures". After each chapter we try to summarize the previous 
findings and connect it to our thesis.  
2.1 Cash 
Extensive research have been done in the cash field by various researchers. We have 
identified several motives to hold, or not to hold, cash in the previous research. Among 
others; flexibility, risk financing, volatility, growth support and avoiding financial distress 
costs are matters that influence the cash holdings positively. Meanwhile, agency costs of 
managerial incentives, opportunity cost of cash and the “cookie-jar dilemma” are matters that 
influence the cash holdings in a negative and reducing way. In this part we discuss these 
motives in more detail to get a better understanding of the theoretical determinants of cash 
holdings. 
Risk financing and buffer against volatility 
Culp’s analysis of cash takes a risk management perspective. He calls stock piling and 
accumulation of cash a sort of risk financing. This is done by firms to make sure that they will 
have sufficient liquid assets to be able to meet all their obligations (for example dividend 
payments). He lists several benefits and disadvantages to doing so. The main advantage of 
risk financing is that it gives the firm more financial flexibility in bad times. In particular, 
firms with a high degree of intangible assets and firms acting in high-growth branches tend to 
benefit the most from this increase in financial flexibility. The reason behind this is that the 
firms’ capital structures already make it hard to borrow money at decent rates, and in bad 
times this could get even harder (Culp, p.131).  
However, Culp also argues that cash reserves not are the most efficient way to create 
credibility because of the cookie jar problem. Instead he names captives as an example of a 
more efficient way to finance risk (Culp, p.132).  
 
Han and Qiu’s (2007) research conclude that the impact of cash flow volatility on a firm’s 
cash holdings depends on its financial constraints. This means that a financially constrained 
company will increase its cash holdings to handle increased volatility in its cash flows. This 
connection cannot be seen with unconstrained firms. Further, they conclude that a firm’s 
10 
 
optimal level for cash holdings change depending on the level of volatility on the market and 
that this volatility and cash bunkering influences investments negatively; that there is a 
negative correlation between investments and cash flow volatility. As a solution for this, they 
suggest to hedge the cash flows. The reduced cash flow uncertainty would also reduce the 
motivation to hold large amounts of cash for precautionary reasons. This means that hedging 
and precautionary cash holdings can be seen as substitutes to each other. The optimal level of 
hedging and precautionary cash holdings can be determined at the point where the marginal 
benefit of one extra dollar for hedging equals the marginal benefit of one extra dollar for 
precautionary cash holdings. The correlation between future investment opportunities and 
future cash flows may also have an impact on the trade-off between hedging and 
precautionary cash holdings. Bates et al. (2009) findings show that the average cash ratio 
increased for US firms between 1980 and 2006. Nonetheless, the peak was reached in 2004. 
The findings indicate that this increase is stronger among non-dividend paying firms and 
firms that operate in industries with the largest increase in idiosyncratic volatility. The main 
reasons for this increase in cash ratios is that inventories have fallen, cash flow risks for firms 
have increased, cash flow risk for firms has increased, capital expenditures have fallen and 
R&D expenditures have increased. They show evidence that the increase in cash flow risk has 
to do with the widely studied increase in idiosyncratic risk during this period. Recent evidence 
of a decrease in idiosyncratic risk should therefore lead firms to reduce their cash holdings 
and may be the explanation to why the cash ratio peaked in 2004.  
Transaction costs 
It is costly to raise funds regardless if the firm chooses to sell semi liquid assets or if the firm 
turns to the external capital markets. Information asymmetry is one reason behind these costs, 
which would be nonexistent in a perfect capital market. These cost disadvantages of raising 
funds would give a firm incentives to fund its activities and needs internally, all in line with 
the well-established pecking-order theory. Firms with good credit ratings or credit lines 
outstanding would therefore hold less cash as these costs shrinks. Firms with high conversion 
cycles and high liquidity in their assets would also hold less cash, as it is easier and cheaper 
for them to raise capital. (Opler et al., 1999) 
Cash as a competitive advantage and a signaling tool 
Pettit states that firms that hold great amounts of cash gain competitive advantages (Pettit, 
2007). In times of crisis when the markets are stressed, the different actors are more likely to 
lower their prices and engage in competitive pricing. Firms that have large cash holdings can 
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last longer with weak margins and later on gain market shares from the non-survivors of the 
price war. Another competitive advantage is the increased bargaining power the cash holding 
firms have. Especially in crisis times, when the credit markets are constrained, cash payments 
have a greater value; the bargaining power toward the supply lines increase which strengthens 
the cash holding firms’ position.  Culp (2006) also brings up the adverse selection problem 
that arises with imperfect information as a gateway to strengthen its position through cash 
management; by stockpiling cash the firm creates credibility for itself and averts some of the 
financial distress costs. 
Avoiding underinvestment problems and gaining flexibility 
Ozkan and Ozkan (2003) find that growth opportunities (measured as high market-to-book 
ratios) have a significant positive impact on cash holdings, which is explained by the fact that 
companies with great growth opportunities would have hard times finding themselves in a 
situation where they have to reject a positive NPV project because of a cash shortage. Costs 
are higher for these expansive firms; therefore they want to avoid possible financial distress. 
There is also a hypothesis that high market-to-book firms have higher agency costs; hence 
they would like to use internal funds and not external. They also find evidence for a negative 
relation between higher debt ratios (higher leverage) and cash holdings. Higher leverage can 
be seen as a proxy for the firm's ability to issue debt. With the ability to issue debt the need 
for internal fund decreases. The negative coefficient may also indicate that the cost of holding 
cash is higher for these firms; meanwhile, the positive coefficient they get between firm size 
and cash holdings may indicate that larger firms are better at generating cash flows (and 
profits) which means that they can accumulate more cash. Campello, Graham and Harvey 
(2010) has surveyed 1050 CFOs in the USA, Europe and Asia to see if their firms were credit 
constrained during the financial crisis of 2007. Their results show that the crisis indeed had an 
impact, although unequally, on the firms real investments. They show that during the crisis, 
financially constrained firms planned to cut their investments and R&D more than financially 
unconstrained firms. They also find out that constrained firms had to cut their dividends and 
burn a sizable amount of their cash reserves. More alarmingly, the constrained firms also had 
to turn down positive NPV projects which would weaken them in the future.  
Agency costs of managerial incentives 
The management’s interests can differ from those of the shareholders. It may accumulate cash 
just because it is risk averse or wants to pursue its own objectives. By having access to cash, 
the management can pursue investments that the capital market would refuse to finance. This 
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is also known as the Cookie-jar problem; the management doesn’t have any major difficulties 
spending the cash reserves on projects not necessarily beneficial for the firm. By avoiding the 
monitoring by the capital markets, these costs can have an adverse effect on the firm value. 
Also worth noting, is that they state that these costs are bigger for companies with large 
market-to-book ratios (Opler et al., 1999).  
The impact of agency cost of debt 
The agency cost of debt problem arises when the interests of the shareholders differ from 
those of the debt holders. These firms have strong incentives to involve asset substitution in 
the debt relationship. The costs associated with this problem make it more expensive or even 
impossible for these firms to take on more debt, which in turn gives a big incentive to hold 
greater amounts of cash and liquid assets. (Jensen, 1976)  
 
Jensen (1986) talks about the link and the balance between the agency costs of managerial 
incentives and the agency cost of debt. Large cash holdings and free cash flow may give the 
managers incentives to invest in unprofitable projects that are of no benefit for the 
shareholders. Increasing leverage would be the solution to this problem, however with an 
increased leverage comes other disadvantages in form of higher costs when the agency cost of 
debt rises and the cost for bankruptcy increases. He concludes that the optimal debt/equity 
ratio is reached when the marginal cost of debt just offsets the marginal benefit. The control 
function of debt is less important for small expansive firms, since they usually have to reach 
out to the market for financing more often (meaning that they will be monitored by the 
shareholders instead of the debt holders). Meanwhile, the control function is even more 
important for large, mature firms in mature industries.     
Opportunity cost of cash 
Pettit brings up the opportunity cost of capital as one disadvantage of holding cash (Pettit, 
2007). As cash has a net present value equal to zero, it can never earn its cost of capital. 
Jacobs and Shivdasani (2012) also bring up the importance of calculating the cost of capital 
correctly and taking it into considerations when firms do their capital budgeting. Jacob and 
Shivdasani states that the cash holdings are at record heights and that these holdings impacts 
the expenditures decisions as the investments predictions for 2013 are flat. 
  
How much is enough? 
While most previous studies show rational reasons to hold cash, they don't give a clear answer 
to how much a firm should hold. Pettit speaks of a decapitalization strategy to find a balance 
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between different stakeholders and fulfilling their competing needs. In practice this means 
that the firm should have sufficient operating liquidity and dry powder for growth, while 
enhancing both credit profiles as well as stock returns (Pettit, p.97). He also argues that the 
required cash balance for adequate operating liquidity is getting lower. This is a result of 
reduced leverage among US listed firms and increased future prospects of company cash 
flows (Pettit, p.99). Pettit also mentions the different tools which the firms use when deciding 
upon how much liquid assets they should hold. Among the more common-used methods we 
find industry-benchmarking and rules of thumb; two percent of revenues, six months of fixed 
costs, 12 months of R&D expenses or the cost of two fabrication plants (Pettit, p.100). 
Understandably it is hard to decide on one rule that works for all firms since they operate in 
different environments. As Culp (2006) noted earlier, a firm with a high degree of intangible 
assets might benefit more from holding cash than a firm with another type of asset-structure.        
Martínez-Sola, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solanos’ research (2013) take the discussion one 
step further when they investigate if there is an optimal level of cash for firms. They use a 
sample consisting of 472 listed US companies. With their findings they argue that there is in 
fact an optimal level of cash, 14% of total assets for the US industrial firms in the sample, and 
being over or below this amount has a negative impact on firm value.  
Opler et al. (1999) have done extensive research in the determinants of corporate cash 
holdings among listed US firms, as well as how firms change these holdings over time. Their 
paper gives a clear picture of the cash holding firms’ characteristics. The firms who have 
difficulties accessing the external financing market are shown to hold large amounts of 
capital; mainly firms with strong growth opportunities, firms with riskier activities or smaller 
firms. The authors also found that the sample firms worked towards fixed cash holding levels, 
that they adjusted upwards or downwards soon after a deviation from the fixed level. On the 
other side we have large firms, or firms with stable credit ratings who hold less cash. Like 
Pettit (2007) and Culp (2006), these results indicate that firms use liquid asset holdings as a 
way to ensure that they can keep investing even when cash flows run too low or when outside 
capital is too expensive.  
Song and Lee (2012) continuous to build on Opler et al.’s (1999) research when they 
investigate how the liquid asset holdings of East-Asian firms changed during and after the 
Asian financial crisis in 1998. In their paper they show how the median cash ratio stayed 
stable for the most part of the 1990’s to suddenly increase after the crisis in 1997-1998. The 
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findings also pointed out that the increase in cash holdings is not explained by changes in firm 
characteristics but instead by changes in the firms’ demand function for cash. The sample 
firms have an increased sensitivity to cash flow risks in the post-crisis period and this is the 
main explaining factor behind their increased cash holdings. The effects on firms’ cash 
holding policies can also be seen long after the crisis has ended, in that they have adopted a 
more conservative view on investments and liquid asset holdings in the post-crisis years 
(fewer investments and more cash holdings). These findings match earlier mentioned 
findings; that firms like to hold more liquid assets the riskier their future cash flows are.  
Finally Simutin (2010) documents that excess cash holdings have a positive relationship with 
future stock returns. He also show, contrary to the intuition that cash holdings are value 
increasing in financial downturns, that stocks of firms with large amounts of excess cash 
actually underperform in these times compared to other firms with less excess cash. Even if 
cash is less risky compared to assets in place he is still able to show that the market betas of 
cash holding firms are larger than those of non-cash holding firms. On the contrary to Song 
and Lee (2012), Simutin (2010) show that firms with excess cash holdings increase their 
future investment rate. This, he states, mean that firms build cash reserves in anticipation of 
future investment opportunities. These firms have larger market betas which show that these 
firms’ growth opportunities also make them more risky. In downturns these growth 
opportunities become less valuable, which result in the lower stock returns, however in times 
of expansions they can instead use their superior cash reserves to invest, which leads to higher 
stock returns in good times. While some of Simutin’s research goes against other researchers’ 
findings, this still shows that riskier firms tend to hold more cash.  
2.1.1 Theory analysis and connection to Thesis 
Following Culp’s risk financing motive, we should be able to see increasing cash holdings 
used as buffers as the external financing alternatives are restrained in crisis times. In the same 
manner, we should be able to see smaller cash holdings in the years previous and after the 
crisis as the cash flow volatility and the economic uncertainty decreases and the external 
capital markets are less constrained. If we follow Pettit’s dry powder for growth reasoning 
and the opportunity cost of cash, where the cash is used for acquisitions and other fire sales in 
economic downturns, we should see an accumulation of cash holdings during stable years, the 
years previous the crisis and after the crisis, and diminishing cash holdings during the crisis 
years.    
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Pettit’s argument that the required cash balance, to maintain stable liquidity in operations, is 
lower due to bigger future prospects of cash flow and reduced cash flow volatility, could be 
worth nothing today. It is worth noting that this is a pre-2008 crisis perspective and may not 
be applicable on today’s economic environment.  
Song and Lee show that the demand function for cash has risen since the East Asian crisis. In 
our sample, we should be able to see an increase of cash holdings during the crisis and post-
crisis years compared to the pre-crisis years. As they state that the cash holding policies has 
permanently changed since the crisis, we shouldn’t see an adjustment downwards to the pre-
crisis cash holding levels as Opler et al.’s studies indicate. 
Simutin’s findings, that excess cash holding are inhibitory during financial downturns could 
be in line with Pettit’s reasoning regarding dry powder for growth and opportunity cost of 
capital. If firms bunker cash during times when there are many good opportunities for good 
acquisitions and investments, they lose some of the main advantages of large cash holdings. 
That Simutin also finds that the firms with large cash holdings often have larger betas, is in 
line with Opler et al.’s findings in cash determinants; that small firms with high cash flow 
volatility and limited access to the capital markets often hold larger amounts of cash to fund 
their investments. That firms with high cash holdings actually increase their investments 
could also be due to the cookie jar problem.  If Simutin (2010) is correct, our study will show 
that the investment rate is independent, or even positively correlated with the size of the cash 
holdings.  
According to Han and Qui's (2007) research; that constrained firms would increase their cash 
holdings, we should see an increase in excess cash during the crisis since more firms would be 
financially constrained. This should be on behalf of investments according to Cambello et al. 
(2010) survey of 1050 CFOs in the United States. Bates et al.’s (2009) findings that the peak 
in increasing cash holdings was reached in 2004 and that the idiosyncratic risk on the market 
is decreasing might instead lead us to believe that cash holdings will continue to decrease 
throughout our timeframe. However the crisis and the risk that followed it, should reverse this 
pattern back to the old structure before the decrease in idiosyncratic risk. We should also find 
that market-to-book ratio has a positive impact on liquid asset holdings in step 1 based on 
Ozkan and Ozkans (2003) research.     
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2.2 Dividends 
Decreasing dividends 
Dividends are a way to redistribute capital that doesn’t earn its cost of capital within the firm 
to the shareholders. Previous studies indicate that dividend reductions often result in a 
negative share price reaction by the market. The dividend-omitting firms in Chritisie’s (1994) 
report were met with abnormal returns of -6.94 % in average, which is a strong sign of the 
markets view of omitting dividends. (Ogden, p.488) 
Charitou et al. find that the negative reaction is more negative for firms that first occur a loss 
and reduce their dividend payments following an established pattern of positive earnings and 
dividend payments than firms with lesser establish positive earnings and dividend payouts 
(Charitou, Lambertides and Theodoulou, 2011). Charitou et al. (2010) also show that 
managers are more reluctant to changing their dividend payment pattern the more consistent 
their patterns have been. However it is also a matter of how persistent they think that their 
earnings difficulties will be. Due to this, dividend payments will be reduced only if 
management believes that the earnings difficulties will be persistent enough to make a 
dividend cut worthwhile. This means that dividend reductions explain more of future earnings 
the longer the pattern of earnings and dividend payments has been going on before the drop in 
earnings and the more substantially dividends and earnings are reduced. 
The financial crisis appeared quite sudden and there were few people that really expected the 
heavy economic downturn. There could be differences in the market reactions when it comes 
to how the dividend reduction is made. Mature companies with low growth prospects, which 
the analysts already counts with future dividend cuts, could have a different reaction by the 
market when they cut their dividends than the high growth company has when it does the 
same. Chemmanur and Tian (2012) investigated if there is any difference between the market 
reactions of a prepared dividends cut and an unprepared one. They show evidence of there 
being a positive effect on both the preparation day and on the announcement day of the 
dividend cut compared to the announcement day of the non-prepared dividend cut. They also 
show that the firms who prepare the market are often firms who are in temporary financial 
difficulties but with good long-term growth prospects while the firms who don’t prepare the 
markets of dividend cuts are firms with weaker long-term prospects. This also leads to the 
conclusion that the firms who prepare the markets also do better when it comes to future stock 
returns. In the same way as dividend reductions or omissions are viewed as negative signals 
by the market, Mahmood, Fayyaz and Ghaffari (2011) show that there is a significant 
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connection between dividend announcements and positive returns which can be considered as 
evidence of weak form of market efficiency.  
Charitou, Lambertides and Theodoulou (2010) also show that managers are more reluctant to 
change their dividend payment patterns the more consistent these patterns have been. 
However it is also a matter of how persistent they think that their earnings difficulties will be. 
Therefore dividend payments will be reduced only if the management believes that the 
earnings difficulties will be persistent enough to make a dividend cut worthwhile. This means 
that dividend reductions explain more of future earnings the longer the pattern of earnings and 
dividend payments has been going on before the drop in earnings and the more substantially 
dividends and earnings are reduced.  
Practical effects by dividends on company value 
Ogden (2003) brings up three practical effects which dividends has on the equity: 
1. Less internal funds for investment 
2. Increased probability that the firm will sell equity to fund investments 
3. Dividend payouts increase the total leverage of the firm  
 
The smaller amount of funds available for investments could be both negative and positive. If 
a company has too much liquid assets the “cookie-jar problem”, where the managers take on 
projects that has a negative net present value could be a concern. For growth companies, with 
strong needs for flexibility, dividend constraints on the cash flows could be devastating.  
The pecking order theory states that businesses will use the internally generated funds first, 
then turn to external financing in form of debt, followed by issuing equity. (Ogden, p.116) As 
the dividend payouts actually increase the total leverage of the firm, the potential financial 
distress costs increase and it can become harder for the firm to acquire new debt. The smaller 
amount of liquid funds, and the higher total leverage make it more probable that the company 
will issue new equity to fund new projects. This could dilute the ownership and increase the 
cost of capital for the firm, as the required return on equity in most cases is higher than the 
cost of debt.  In the same manner, Lang and Litzenberger (1988) find that the Principal agent 
theory can be applied to a firm’s dividend policy. They find evidence that increased dividends 
signals that the over investment problem will be reduced and in that way the firm value gets 
enhanced. In the other direction, decreased dividends signals that more projects with a 
negative net present value will be taken on, and thereby the value of the firm will be reduced.  
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Personal taxes, shareholders’ liquidity needs, investment opportunities and transaction costs 
all affect investors’ preferences for dividends. Investors with high income, high tax brackets 
and with long time-horizons for their investments, would like to minimize the dividend 
payments to minimize the capital gains and the taxes that comes with those gains. Investors 
with low income, with low tax brackets and a strong need for periodic payouts and liquidity 
will try to maximize these payouts. It is very important for companies to know their clientele 
and their preferences. If a company adopts a dividend policy that is attractive for its investor 
clientele it can boost its company value. As dividends are being an object of double taxation, 
both on the firm level and on the shareholders income level, Ogden show that investors will 
demand a premium that is positively related to the firm’s dividend policy (Ogden, p. 478). 
Pettit states that the dividend policy of a company affects the marketability of stocks, but that 
dividend levels don’t affect the firm valuation, as there are no correlation between multiples 
and yield and if there is any correlation; it is negative. Since it is mostly mature companies 
with low growth opportunities that have high dividend levels, valuation is actually negative 
correlated with the dividend yields. (Pettit , p. 165) In the opposite way; Fama and French 
found that after analyzing the pricing of US firms between 1965-1992 a positive relation 
between dividends and firm value could be identified, which is inconsistent with the view that 
the tax-effects is value destroying. (Ogden, p. 480) 
Dividends as a signaling tool 
Information asymmetry is a market imperfection that could make it difficult for companies to 
signal their true strength to the market, which affects their company value. Dividends could 
act as a tool to communicate the strength (and even weaknesses of the company). (Ogden, p. 
484) Aggarwal, Cao and Chens’s (2012) research shows that dividends work better as a 
signaling tool for firms operating in a poor information environment. He uses a sample of 
ADR firms traded in the US. These firms don’t have the same capability to share information 
to its investors and therefore signaling through dividend payments become an important tool. 
However this effect quickly declines for firms with better ways of sharing information. 
In their studies of the East Asian firms before, during and after the financial crisis, Song and 
Lee (2012) found that the Asian firms reduced their dividends payments during the financial 
crisis, but reinstated them shortly after indicating that the crisis had no long term effect on the 
dividend policy. 
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2.2.1 Theory analysis and connection to thesis 
The previous research strongly state that the market’s reactions on dividends reductions are 
negative. However, none of the work that are made takes into account the economic 
conditions during the time of the dividend reductions. Following the old theory, we should be 
able to see negative market reactions in form of a weaker market value of a dividend reducing 
firm, but we can’t solely rely on previous work when it comes to cutting dividends in the time 
of financial crisis. The work done by Charitou et al. (2011) state that the market reactions are 
more negative if a company has a previous, strong pattern of dividends payouts. The financial 
crisis occurred after many years of strong growth; even the strongest of companies received a 
hit by the macro economic conditions. In our studies, cutting the dividends after years of 
growth and stable dividends policies should result in a strong negative market reaction.  At 
the same time, the same authors find that managers are reluctant to change their dividend 
policy if their previous pattern of policy is strong. If this is correct, we should see fewer 
dividend reductions in our sample. Also the studies made by Thomas, Chemmanur and Tian 
(2012) shows that the market reacts more negatively if it is not prepared for the dividend cut, 
which should show as stronger negative market reactions in the crisis years than in the boom- 
and recovery years.  
When it comes to the practical impact of dividends on the valuation of a company; the 
previous work point in different directions. Pettit (2007) states that the valuation is negative in 
the correlation with dividend policy, meanwhile Fama and French state the opposite. Ogden 
states that a firm can boost its firm value by adopting a dividend policy which attracts the 
shareholder clientele. If the market reactions are different between companies after a dividend 
cut (due to different clientele) there will be hard to find any clear indication of the markets 
preferences in our regression model. If the dividend policy is a strong signaling tool that could 
help relatively strong firms back on track, we would see few dividend cuts or a fast reinstating 
of the old dividend policy after a dividend cut.  
Overall, the previous research indicate that dividend cuts are not to prefer but at the same time 
Song and Lee (2011) show us that firms actually reduce their dividends in crisis time, but that 
this is only temporary and that the East Asian crisis had no long term effect on the dividend 
policy.  
20 
 
2.3 Research and Development & Capital expenditures 
Increasing cash-holdings on the behalf of investments 
As mentioned before, Song and Lee’s (2012) research show that East-Asian firms tended to 
increase their cash-holdings during and after the 1998 Asian financial crisis. They did so by 
decreasing investment expenses (CAPEX and M&A). It also shows possible evidence that 
dividend paying firms increase their cash-holdings by decreasing investment expenses more 
than non-dividend paying firms. Although the difference is small, this could indicate that 
dividends are stickier and therefore harder to decrease when needed, instead dividend paying 
firms need to decrease other things more than non-dividends paying firms.  
Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutters (2010) research investigate how US firms changed their view on 
capital structure after the Sarbane-Oxley act (SOX) was implemented in 2002. They came to 
the conclusion that after SOX was implemented, the risk-seeking behavior decreased among 
US firms. Just like the East-Asian firms in Song and Lee’s research (2012) this resulted in an 
increase in the firms’ cash-holdings, and once again, this cash was taken from the investments 
in R&D and CAPEX which decreased post-SOX. These findings give us a pattern that shows 
that firms that want to decrease risk often aim to increase liquid assets, with reallocations of 
capital as a result. 
Duchin et al. (2010) find that corporate investments decline during the financial crisis of 
2007. They come to the conclusion that the greatest declines can be seen among firms with 
low cash reserves, financially constrained firms or firms that operates in industries historically 
dependent of external financing.      
Value of R&D and CAPEX 
Other research show that both R&D and CAPEX investments are important for firm value as 
well as improving future earnings. Increasing cash by decreasing these two kinds of 
investments could have negative impacts for the firm in the future. Sueyoshi and Goto (2010) 
come to the conclusion that R&D expenses have an impact on Japanese firms’ market values. 
However the amount of impact varies between industries. More mature firms’ market values 
seem to have a more significant connection to the R&D expenses than newer firms’ values. 
Although Griliches (1986) did not investigate the connection between R&D investments and 
firm value, he found that US firms R&D expenditures supported productivity growth and that 
the investments, in average, earned high returns. He also found that the basic research was 
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influencing the productivity more than other types of R&D. As market value often is defined 
as the NPV of all future revenues, R&D increases should lead to a higher market value. 
Piergiovanni and Santorelli (2010) also found positive effects of R&D and CAPEX 
investments. They conclude that the capital expenditures are a major driver of new knowledge 
creation (measured as filings for new patents) and that R&D and capital expenditures are two 
complementary forces that work together as determinants for the whole innovation process. 
They bring up the importance of a well balanced mix of both R&D and Capital expenditure 
investments; a firm needs both to prosper.  
Difficulties of reducing R&D and CAPEX 
The positive effects that come from R&D and CAPEX investments must be compared to the 
benefits of holding cash when the firm makes the decision of which route to go. However, 
these evidence show that it is no easy decision to make. Baum (2012) continues to state 
difficulties with reducing the R&D expenditures. As the R&D often is rooted in human 
capital, cutting down these investments would result in loosing important human capital to 
other firms and competitors. One interesting note in Baums (2012) research is that firms make 
bigger cash managerial changes when planning for future R&D expenditures than when they 
are planning for capital expenditures. They explain this with the fact that the R&D 
investments often result in intangible assets that cannot be put as a security for future external 
financing. Their findings show evidence that firms with future R&D expenditures actually 
bunker and accumulate their cash holdings.  
 
Lower asset tangibility on R&D investments compared to CAPEX investments makes them 
more expensive to finance using external capital, compared to CAPEX. This makes it more 
important for R&D heavy firms to have cash reserves as a buffer against future shocks to cash 
flows. (Bates, 2009)  
2.3.1 Theory analysis and connection to thesis 
The evidence above show that when firms need to decrease financial risk they tend to increase 
their liquid asset holdings which then results in decreasing investments (Song & Lee, 2012; 
Bargeron, Lehn & Zutters, 2010). Since we are analyzing the US firms during a time of crisis 
we expect to see the same kind of results as Song and Lee (2012) did. If the sample firms 
increase their cash holdings, they will have to decrease either R&D investments, CAPEX 
investments or dividends payments. Duchin et al.’s (2010) findings that corporate investments 
decline during the financial crisis of 2007 also draws us to this conclusion.  
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This theory section has given clear indications that a firm’s value and future profitability can 
take damage if investments are decreased (Sueyoshi & Goto, 2010; Griliches, 1986; 
Piergiovanni & Santorelli, 2010). When we in the analysis finally analyze what impact a 
decrease in any of these three will have on the market value of the firm, we hope to see a clear 
result that either matches these theories and earlier research or that it does not. However the 
hypothesis is that we will see a decrease in the firms’ market values if they decided to 
decrease investments which would hurt the company in the long run.  
Finally Baum (2012) speaks of the difficulties with decreasing the firms R&D expenses; that 
the firms with important human capital risk to lose it to competitors. This indicates that R&D 
is, similarly to dividends, quite sticky which means that it is harder to decrease without a 
negative impact on the firm. This could mean that, out of the three (R&D, CAPEX and 
Dividends), CAPEX investments could actually be the easiest one to decrease when the need 
to build cash reserves is large. If this is the case it will surely be seen in our analysis.     
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3.0 Choice of method 
In this chapter we present the methodological framework used in our thesis. We discuss what 
we are going to do, what sample we used, exclusions and how we secured reliability in our 
analysis and regressions. We also discuss all the performed tests in detail and why they are 
important to our findings. 
Since we examine the financial crisis effect on excess cash holdings, on the investment 
activities and the consequences of these effects on the market value of the companies, a 
quantitative method is strongly preferred instead of a qualitative method. The quantitative 
method has in earlier studies been the one most frequently used (Opler et al.,1999; Simutin, 
2010;  Song & Lee, 2012) and makes it possible for us to make the needed statistical tests and 
regressions. A panel data regression is preferred as it allows us to analyze the variations both 
from a time and from a cross-sectional dimension. In this way panel data has a greater ability 
to capture the behavior of the observations in the sample (Hsiao, 2007). As we want to 
measure differences between time periods (one period defined as more than one year) and the 
behavior of the US firms in general, it is hard to argue for a more suited analysis method. 
 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of 1701 American firms that have been in business since 2000 to at least 
year 2011. These are the years before, during and shortly after the latest financial crisis. Year 
2011 is the latest year which DataStream can provide enough satisfactory data for.  The firms 
are listed on either Nasdaq, NYSE or NYSE Alternext (former NYSE Amex). The firms in 
the sample range from all sizes across all industries except for those excluded under the 
exclusion part. From this sample we extract the yearly data we need for our empirical statistic 
tests.  
3.2 Time frame  
Since the mid-70s there has been a broadly accepted view of how to define a recession. Julius 
Shishkin (1974) wrote a list with rules of thumb of which to use when defining an economic 
regression. One of the most fundamental rules on how to identify a regression was that there 
had to be two consistent negative quarters of GDP-growth. (O’Donoghue, n.d.)  
However, this view has nowadays become more unpopular, since it appears to be too shallow. 
Shishkin’s rules of thumb didn’t identify the regression 2001, which only consisted of one 
quarter of negative GDP growth but resulted in a loss of 2.7 million jobs. NBER (the National 
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Bureau of Economic Research) has a broader perspective of how to identify a recession. 
NBER Business cycle committee doesn’t have any fixed definition of an economic recession. 
The committee:  
"Examines and compares the behavior of various measures of broad activity: real 
GDP measured on the product and income sides, economy-wide employment, and 
real income. The Committee may also consider: Indicators that do not cover the 
entire economy, such as real sales and the Federal Reserve's index of industrial 
production (IP). A well-defined peak or trough in real sales or IP might help to 
determine the overall peak or trough dates particularly if the economy-wide 
indicators are in conflict or do not have well-defined peaks or troughs." (NBER, 
2010)  
The committee define the financial crisis to reach between the period December 2007 until 
June 2009 after analyzing:  
"Macroeconomic advisers' monthly GDP, The Stock-Watson index of monthly 
GDP, Their index of monthly GDI, An average of their two indexes of monthly 
GDP and GDI, Real manufacturing and trade sales, index of Industrial 
Production, Real personal income less transfers, Aggregate hours of work in the 
total economy, Payroll survey employment and Household survey employment." 
(NBER, 2010) 
Graph 1 US GDP change between 2001 and 2012, data gathered from Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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As both the thumb rules made by Shishkin, the NBER view and the visual GDP peaks in 
Graph 1 indicate a quite clear start and ending of the crisis, we have chosen to determine the 
crisis years to last between December 2007 and June 2009. 
3.3 Exclusions 
All financial and utilities firms (SIC-code 6000-6999) are excluded from the sample. The 
reason for this is that these firms may have to hold cash in order to meet capital requirements 
stated by the law. Therefore, keeping these firms in the sample could lead to misleading 
results. We also exclude firms that were not present at the beginning of the analyzed time 
period as well as firms that have seized to exist during the time period. This could lead to 
potential survivor bias, however we discuss why this is not a problem in our thesis in the 
limitation section. Firms with any missing yearly data have also been excluded.  
3.4 Sample assumptions 
For firms that have not reported any R&D expenses or paid dividends we have assumed that 
these values are 0. We controlled this assumption with 20 companies’ financial statements to 
be sure that the missing data really meant that they had not reported it in their financial 
statement, which was correct in every case. 
3.5 Regression  
Step1. 
As the need for cash vary substantially between industries and firms based on factors such as 
size and nature of business, we need to take this into account when calculating the cash 
richness of a firm. The regression formula for measuring cash holdings has been constructed 
by Opler et al. (1999) and has been widely used and accepted in previous research in the field 
of work (Simutin, 2010; Song & Lee, 2012). By comparing the regressions estimated "normal 
values" with the companies’ actual cash holdings we can estimate the amount of excess cash. 
We can then construct a table with the mean excess cash holdings for every period and 
compare these to the mean changes in R&D-ratio, CAPEX-ratio and dividend-ratio.   
Regression Formula: 
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Dependent variable: 
Liquid asset holding: As the dependent variable we use liquid asset holdings. This variable is 
calculated by dividing cash and cash equivalents with total book value of assets minus cash 
and cash equivalents (hereafter referred to as net assets). 
C = Cash and cash equivalents / (Total book value of assets - cash and cash equivalents) 
Independent variables:  
MB-ratio: The book value of assets does not take into account if the firm has many positive 
NPV projects in the future. To get the likelihood that a firm will have growth opportunities in 
the future we need to use the market-to-book ratio of the company’s assets. This is calculated 
by taking the book value of assets, less the book value of equity, plus the market value of 
equity, divided by net assets. 
MB = (Book value of assets - Book value of equity + Market value of equity) / Net assets 
Cash flow: The cash flows are calculated by taking EBIT plus depreciation minus taxes, 
interest and common dividends. 
CF = EBIT + Depreciation - taxes - interest - common dividends 
Liquid asset substitutes: To measure liquid asset substitutes we use working capital minus 
cash and cash equivalents divided by net assets. 
WC = (WC - Cash and cash equivalents) / Net assets 
Financial distress costs: R&D expenses are divided by sales in order to measure the potential 
financial distress costs. 
RD = R&D expenses / Sales 
Firm Size: Firm size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the book value of assets in 
2011 dollars. 
Size = LN (Book value of assets) 
CAPEX: We get capital expenditures by dividing capital expenditures by net assets. 
CPX = CAPEX / Net assets 
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Financial leverage: To calculate the financial leverage for each firm we divide the total debt 
with the total book value of assets. 
L = Total debt / Total book value of assets 
Cash flow riskiness: As a measure of cash flow riskiness we use the industry sigma. This is 
computed by calculating the standard deviation of each individual firm’s cash flows (as 
defined above) over an 11 year period. The firms are then divided into industries using their 
2-digit Sic-codes and the average value for each industry is the industry sigma.  
Dividend dummies: Finally a dummy variable is also used in the regression model to show 
firms who pay dividends. We have assigned the number 1 to firms that do pay dividends and a 
0 to firms that do not.  
Step 2. 
Regression formulas: 
                                          
                                           
                                           
 
To determine the relationship between excess cash holdings and the R&D-ratio, dividend-
ratio and CAPEX-ratio during the three different periods (Pre-crisis, Crisis, Post-crisis) we 
need to make nine additional regression models. We use the same regression model, modified 
with our own dependent variables, as Song and Lee (2012) use for measuring the cash-ratios 
impact on investment. The dependent variables in these three functions are: R&D expenses 
divided by assets, Dividend payments divided by revenues and CAPEX divided by assets. As 
the independent variables we use EBIT-ratio (EBIT divided by assets), Market-to-book ratio 
(as described above), excess cash (which we get from step 1) and sales growth. We divide the 
samples into the three periods: 2001-2007 for Pre-crisis, 2008-2009 for Crisis and 2010-2011 
for Post-crisis.    
Step 3. Regressions and cluster construction 
As we want to measure the impact of changes in R&D, CAPEX and dividends to the market 
value, we put these variables in relation to the market value. Simutin (2010) shows mainly 
three other factors that explain total stock returns. As the market value of a company is the 
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predicted present value of all future cash flows from the company, we use the same variables; 
Market-to-book ratio, Size and Beta as the other explaining variables for the market value. 
These are the variables which “Fama- French three factor model” also takes into account 
when calculating the expected return for a stock (Fama & French, 1992). We then do panel 
data regressions for all periods; previous, during and after the financial crisis to see which of 
the different ways to bunker cash is preferred by the market and if this differs between the 
different periods of economic activity. As we want to see how the market reacts to a certain 
action, we meassure the change in market value against the changes in the explaining 
variables. 
 Regression formula: 
                                                                     
To complete the regression results and be able to analyze some characteristic, we cluster the 
firms using the changes in the examined variables (R&D, dividends, capital expenditures or a 
mixture of more than one) as determinants of cluster inherency.  
The clusters: 
1. Companies with pure R&D reductions 
2. Companies with R&D and CAPEX reductions  
3. Companies that have reduced R&D, CAPEX and dividends 
4. Companies that have reduced R&D and dividends 
5. Companies with pure CAPEX reductions 
6. Companies that have reduced both dividends and CAPEX 
7. Companies that have no cut downs, only increases in the expenditures 
8. Companies with pure dividend reductions 
We calculate the average beta, Market-to-book ratio and size for all clusters. 
NOTE: Beta is calculated on yearly data for all the companies against the Nasdaq index. The 
Nasdaq stock exchange is big enough to not be too affected by individual big companies, in 
that way we don’t risk to measure each company movements against one dominating 
company.  
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3.7 Reliability and validity of the method 
Our methodology is based on earlier papers that have proven to be reliable (Opler, 1999; Song 
& Lee, 2012; Simutin, 2010). Robust tests have been done in these studies to ensure that they 
are reliable and valid. Exclusions in our sample have been done only when we have found 
reasons to do so in the theory used in previous papers. This ensures that we won’t lose 
reliability by doing so. We have also used well-known and reliable computer software and 
databases when gathering our data and performing our tests. The data is gathered from 
DataStream and the statistical tests and regressions are done in E-views. Both of these are 
well recognized and have been well-used by researchers in the past.   
To further ensure the reliability of our models we need to test our regressions for potential 
pooling problems. The simplest way to test our data would be to estimate a pooled regression 
on all observations together, however, by doing so we would assume no heterogeneity and no 
time specificity. To assume that eg. the cash holdings of a firm in year t would be completely 
independent and have no relation to the cash holdings at t-1, would not be appropriate.  
Heteroscedasticity 
When examining cross sectional data regarding companies there is a big risk for 
heteroscedasticity; that the residuals are correlated with the explaining variables. Our first 
regression which estimates a regression for the firms’ cash holdings, the residuals are most 
likely to be higher for large sized firm than for a SME firm. E-views has no built in function 
to test panel data for heteroscedasticity which forces us to make the Breusch-Pagan test 
manually. In table A2 in appendix section 8.2.1 our result for regression 1 is presented. 
 
Table A2 shows a regression with the squared residuals as the dependant variable and the 
original explaining variable on the independent side of the regression. As we can see the 
significance level is far below the 95 % limit. This tells us that there is in fact 
heteroscedasticity in our model and that we need to use robust standard errors in our test. 
These Breusch-Pagan tests are made for all of the independent regressions as we can see in 
section 8.2 of the Appendix. They show strong signs of heteroscedasticity in almost every 
regression with the exceptions beung table A12 and A14. Both Yamano (2009) and 
Schmidheiny (2009) argues that in practice it is hard to estimate the structure of 
heteroscedasticity and therefore it is safer to use robust standard errors even if the sample is 
homoscedastic. This is the case due to the fact that even in a homoscedastic sample the robust 
standard errors would just become ordinary OLS standars errors. Woolridge (p.277, 2005) 
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also argues that if the sample is large you can always use the robust standard errors. But for 
the sake of it we have decided to include the OLS standard error tests in Appendix section 8.8 
for the tests without heteroscedasticity. However, these strong signs lead us to the conclusion 
that the use of robust standard errors is preferred for the most unbiased results in our 
regressions, even if we trade away some efficiency in the model. 
 
 
Allowing for heterogeneity and time-specificity in our sample 
Using large samples with different industries raise the potential problem of heterogeneity in 
the sample; that the units in the sample differ in characteristics from each other which is 
shown as correlations between the explaining variables and non-constant error terms. We also 
need to take time-specificity into account; that time periods differ in characteristics from each 
other and affect the variables and error terms.  
To see whether we need to use fixed or random effects in the cross-section and period 
dimension when doing our regressions we have made likelihood-ratio and Hausman tests. The 
likelihood-ratio test tests if we need to take any effects into account at all and an example can 
be seen in table A15 in appendix section 8.3.1. As we can see in table A15 the significance of 
0.00 means that we reject the null hypothesis and confirm that we have significant 
heterogeneity (i.e. that the pooled regression is miss-specified). This means that we need to 
take either random or fixed effects into account for our regression. To test which of these two 
we should use we set up a Hausman test as can be seen in table A40 in appendix section 8.4.1. 
The significance of 0.00 in table A40 means that the null hypothesis (that a random effect 
model is well-specified) is rejected and that we should use fixed effects in the cross-section 
tab. The same tests are then committed for the period tab. All Likelihood-ratio tests and 
Hausman tests can be seen in Appendix section 8.3 and 8.4.  
Since most of our tests show that we should use fixed effects in both cross-section and period 
we use this as often as we can. The exception is when we have a non-time dependent variable 
(like cash flow riskiness in step 1) which prevents us from using fixed effects in the cross-
section tab. The hausman test is also impossible to make for the period-dimension on our 
crisis and post-crisis samples since there are not enough periods in the sample. In these cases 
we have used fixed effects. In general the idea of the Hausman test is that one will use the 
random effects estimate until the Hausman test rejects it. However in practice the failure to 
reject would mean that fixed effects and random effects are close enough for it to not matter 
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which one you use (Woolridge, p.499). This leads us to the conclusion that we can use the 
fixed effects in every period even if we (according to the Hausman test) could use random 
effects if we wanted to.  
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an important issue to take into consideration when dealing with multiple 
regression analysis and refers to high correlations between the explanatory variables in the 
regression. (Alkan & Attakan, 2013) By using the rule of thumb that the critical values for 
multicollinearity is 0.7 we can’t find any indications of problematic correlations between the 
explaining variables in the first regression which can be seen in Table A56 in appendix 
section 8.5.1.  We made these correlation matrixes for all of the regressions and couldn’t find 
any problematic correlations which can be seen in Appendix section 8.5. 
Normality tests 
To test for normality in our model we used a set of normality tests. As can be seen in 
appendix 8.6 all of the models reject the null-hypothesis; that the residuals are normally 
distributed. Although due to the very large size of the sample this shouldn’t imply any 
problem for our analysis.  
Interpretation of the beta coefficient  
In step three, where we measure the examined variables different effect on the market value, 
we need to interpret the beta-coefficient for each variable. As the examined explaining 
variables and the dependent variable is measured and given in percentages, we do not need to 
standardize the coefficients (as you need when measuring impact between explaining 
variables given in different units and scale). In this way we can simply look at the beta-
coefficients and compare their impacts on the dependent variable. 
Interpretation of the significance levels 
To accept or reject the null-hypothesis you can use different significance or confidence levels. 
The most common limits for the significance level is 1% (prob.=0.01), 5% (prob.=0.05) and 
10% (prob. 0.1). (Cowles & Davis, 1982) In this thesis we will only use the 5% significance 
level ( 95% confidence level). 
Exclusion of outliers 
Outliers are extreme observations that deviate strongly from the other observation in the 
sample and can affect and distort the regressions and the analyses results. To detect the 
outliers we calculated the Z-score for all variables. We used the common rule of thumb 
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described by Martin (2007); to exclude all observations with a Z-score higher than 3.29 or 
lower than -3.29. By doing this, the means and medians of the sample are drawn together.  
Other adjustments to the sample 
In step 3 when calculating the market value increase we needed to adjust for the inflation 
impact. We adjusted all market values with the US CPI (consumer price index) gathered from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Limitations 
Since all of our data is collected from DataStream this puts a natural limitation to our 
sample’s size. We also need to have all the information for every company for every year that 
we want to analyze. This means that firms that did not survive from 2000-2011 have been 
removed which creates a risk for survival bias when we only analyze the results from those 
that have survived. However Simutin (2010) come to the conclusion that his results do not 
change very much when removing non-survivors (from a sample of all firms) which indicates 
that survival bias should not be a problem in our analysis either. 
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4.0 Empirical findings 
In this chapter we present our findings from the regressions and tables. This chapter is 
organized into three main chapters; Step 1 findings, Step 2 findings and Step 3 findings. For 
an analysis of these findings please turn to Chapter 5. 
4.1 Step 1 findings 
By taking all the needed actions to insure the reliability of the model we end up with the 
regression model  presented in table 1. We will try to clarify what the different correlation 
coefficients indicate: 
Table 1 Regression for step 1 with liquid asset holdings as the dependent variable, with periodical fixed effects 
and robust standard errors (white cross-section). The regression describes the whole period and is used to get 
excess cash. For a more detailed version please see Table A77 in appendix section 8.9. 
 
Description of coefficients in Table 1 
CAPEX (+) – The positive correlation coefficient show that firms with higher capital 
expenditures hold more cash.  
Variable Liquid asset holdings
C -2.431763
Prob. 0.0000
CAPEX 0.381414
Prob. 0.0000
CASH FLOW -0.231863
Prob. 0.0000
CASH FLOW RISKINESS 1.431077
Prob. 0.0000
DIVIDEND DUMMY -0.500813
Prob. 0.0000
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 0.000622
Prob. 0.0644
FIRM SIZE 0.079215
Prob. 0.0000
LEVERAGE -0.368775
Prob. 0.0000
MARKET TO BOOK 0.005624
Prob. 0.0000
WC -0.190632
Prob. 0.0000
Adjusted R-square 0.29066
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
N 18136
Firm dummy No
Period dummy Yes
Robust standard errors Yes
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Cash flow (-) – Firms with high cash flows hold less cash. 
Cash flow riskiness (+) – Firms within an industry with high volatility in cash flows hold 
more cash. 
Dividends (-) – Firms that pay dividends hold less cash 
Financial distress (+) – Firms with high financial distress costs hold more cash. However, this 
impact is not significant at the 95 % limit. 
Firm size (+) – Large firms hold more cash. This could be an indication that bigger and 
mature firms don’t strive after WACC minimization. 
Leverage (+) – Firms with high leverage hold more cash, which contradicts the research who 
states that firms with good opportunities to issue debt hold less cash. 
Market-to-book (+) – Firms with higher market-to-book ratio hold more cash as a high 
market-to-book ratio indicate larger growth opportunities and the flexibility motive of cash 
increases in impact. 
Working capital (-) – Firms with large rates of working capital hold less cash. 
Table 2 Describes the mean change of the variables over the three periods. A more detailed version can be found 
in Appendix section 8.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Variable Means Means Means
EXCESS CASH -2.534805 -2.259277 -2.218522
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
FIRM SIZE 12.61921 12.92025 13.02968
Prob. 0.0000 0.0249 0.0000
WC -0.176818 -0.137169 -0.128627
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MARKET TO BOOK 11.82866 6.954343 8.628751
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LEVERAGE 0.913149 0.920419 0.890464
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
FINANCIAL DISTRESS 1.497416 0.85304 2.13792
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
DIVIDENDS 0.418425 0.711562 0.512372
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASHFLOW RISKINESS 0.45082 0.451535 0.452364
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CASH FLOW 0.159311 0.078189 0.184351
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CAPEX 0.370134 0.350526 0.336878
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 3 A detailed table of R&D-ratio, CAPEX-ratio and Dividend-ratio over the three periods. The table also 
shows the mean change in the three variables over the analyzed periods.  
 
4.1.1 Regression summary 
If we look at the descriptive Table 2 (or the more detailed version in Appendix section 8.7.1) 
we can see that the firms in the sample increased their excess cash holdings throughout the 
periods. The excess cash increases from -2,53 in the pre-crisis period to -2,25 during the crisis 
years and settles at a -2,21 limit in the post-crisis period. We also see that the leverage is on a 
quite stable level throughout the periods. The table also show how the capital expenditures are 
reduced parallel to the increased excess cash holdings from period to period. If we look at the 
dividend dummy variable, we can actually see that more firms pay dividends in the post-crisis 
period compared  to the pre-crisis period, but that alone does not tell us if the firms pay more 
or less in dividends. Table 3 contains more detailed information for R&D-ratio, CAPEX-ratio 
and dividend-ratio for every period without any dependency exclusion from any of the other 
variables. The results from Table 2 indicates that excess cash holdings are impacted by the 
new economic conditions and that the effect most likely is permanent and not only of a short 
term character. We can see that the firms are keeping their leverage and Debt-to-equity ratio 
at a constant level, indicating that the newly generated cash holdings aren't a result of 
externally raised funds, but instead internally generated and redistributed. The detailed table 
for dividends, R&D and CAPEX (Table 3) strengthens this perception by showing that all of 
these variables are reduced in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
R&D RATIO CAPEX RATIO DIV RATIO R&D RATIO CAPEX RATIO DIV RATIO R&D RATIO CAPEX RATIO DIV RATIO
 Mean 0.258206 0.391765 0.027016 0.241977 0.37552 0.026338 0.2215 0.346096 0.025922
 Median 0.000142 0.139987 0.000148 0.000108 0.119845 0.000852 0.000137 0.113817 0.000893
 Maximum 16.14353 6.462806 48.33333 16.21767 6.385214 3.436709 16.0343 6.394033 2.198864
 Minimum 2.38E-08 0.0000002 5.8E-09 0.000000024 0.000000201 6.84E-09 2.07E-08 0.000000646 7.34E-09
 Std. Dev. 1.165019 0.71912 0.486695 1.112893 0.703125 0.119238 1.00351 0.665965 0.102451
 Skewness 8.482165 4.031157 87.77179 9.187015 4.119175 15.13245 9.45944 4.456967 11.5982
 Kurtosis 85.90277 23.14491 8381.147 100.5232 24.32146 320.0211 106.5495 27.83193 174.5034
 Jarque-Bera 3532889 231838.8 3.48E+10 1386981 73647.2 14367601 1561416 98118.68 4243128
 Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
 Sum 3057.413 4629.876 321.3291 817.8827 1270.385 89.54829 749.1145 1170.843 88.13387
 Sum Sq. Dev. 16070.08 6110.972 2817.116 4184.995 1672.011 48.32627 3404.773 1499.947 35.6764
 Observations 11841 11818 11894 3380 3383 3400 3382 3383 3400
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4.2 Step 2 findings 
In step two we try to find out the typical characteristics of an R&D-, CAPEX-, and dividend 
heavy firm before, during and after the crisis.  
Table 4 The regressions with R&D-ratio as the dependent variable for all three periods, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). For a more detailed version please see 
Table A78-A80 in appendix section 8.9. 
 
 
Description of coefficients in table 4, pre-crisis 
Excess cash (+) – Increases in excess cash result in a R&D-ratio increase. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
Market-to-Book (+) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate 
the real impact from this variable on the R&D-ratio. 
Sales growth (-) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the R&D-ratio. 
Description of coefficients in table 4, crisis 
Excess cash (+) – Increases in excess cash result in a R&D-ratio increase. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
Market-to-Book (+) – Increases in the market-to-book ratio result in a R&D-ratio increase. 
Sales growth (-) – Increases in sales growth result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
Variable Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
C 0.342594 0.152791 0.221056
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
EXCESS CASH 0.038772 0.0010 -0.015834
Prob. 0.0026 0.0000 0.0000
EBIT RATIO -0.03383 -0.034811 -0.110121
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
MB RATIO 0.000705 0.014703 -0.00062
Prob. 0.2940 0.0000 0.0000
SALES GROWTH -0.000106 -0.000105 -0.036845
Prob. 0.0818 0.0000 0.0000
Adjusted R-square 0.738285 0.89303 0.845921
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 11641 3340 3343
Firm dummy Yes Yes Yes
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes
R&D-ratio
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Description of coefficients in table 4, post-crisis 
Excess cash (-) – Increases in excess cash result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
Market-to-Book (-) – Increases in the market-to-book ratio result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
Sales growth (-) – Increases in sales growth result in a R&D-ratio decrease. 
4.2.1 R&D-ratio regression summary 
If we start this summary by looking at the findings in table 4 and the regression for the R&D-
ratio before the crisis, we can see that it will be impacted positively by excess cash as well as 
market-to-book ratio while EBIT-ratio and sales growth has a negative impact. However the 
impacts of the market-to-book ratio and sales growth are not significant. The directions of the 
coefficients do not change during the crisis, although all of them are significant in this period. 
In the post-crisis period the market-to-book ratio as well as excess cash changes to having a 
negative impact on R&D-ratio.  
Table 5 The regressions with CAPEX-ratio as the dependent variable for all three periods, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). For a more detailed version please 
see Table A81-A83 in appendix section 8.9. 
 
Description of coefficients in table 5, pre-crisis 
Excess cash (-) – Increases in excess cash result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
Variable Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
C 0.347133 0.310382 0.320385
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
EXCESS CASH -0.013472 -0.032398 -0.010952
Prob. 0.0647 0.0000 0.0000
EBIT RATIO -0.005067 -0.000734 0.005829
Prob. 0.0048 0.0000 0.0000
MB RATIO 0.000336 -0.002384 -0.000577
Prob. 0.2974 0.0000 0.0000
SALES GROWTH 3.63E-05 1.90E-05 0.028295
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Adjusted R-square 0.72493 0.765788 0.866384
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 11641 3340 3343
Firm dummy Yes Yes Yes
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes
Capex-ratio
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Market-to-Book (+) – As the variable has a very low significant level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the CAPEX-ratio. 
Sales growth (+) – As the variable has a very low significant level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the CAPEX-ratio. 
Description of coefficients in table 5, crisis 
Excess cash (-) – Increases in excess cash result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
Market-to-Book (-) – Increases in market-to-book result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
Sales growth (+) – Increases in sales growth result in a CAPEX-ratio increase. 
Description of coefficients in table 5, post-crisis 
Excess cash (-) – Increases in excess cash result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
EBIT-ratio (+) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a CAPEX-ratio increase. 
Market-to-Book (-) – Increases in market-to-book result in a CAPEX-ratio decrease. 
Sales growth (+) – Increases in sales growth result in a CAPEX-ratio increase. 
4.2.2 CAPEX-ratio regression summary    
If we look at the findings in table 5 we can see that during the pre-crisis period  the market-to-
book ratio and sales growth have positive impacts on the firms’ CAPEX-ratio. The two other 
variables, with a negative effect on CAPEX, are excess cash and EBIT-ratio. However, we 
fail to see any significant connection between CAPEX-ratio and market-to-book ratio or sales 
growth during the pre-crisis time. When the crisis starts we see that the market-to-book ratio 
shifts to having a negative impact and all variables now have significant impacts on thr 
CAPEX-ratio. After the crisis the EBIT-ratio changes to having a positive coefficient. All 
variables are still significant.    
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Table 6 The regressions with dividend-ratio as the dependent variable for all three periods, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). For a more detailed version please 
see Table A84-A86 in appendix section 8.9. 
 
Description of coefficients in table 6, pre-crisis 
Excess cash (-) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the dividend-ratio. 
EBIT-ratio (+) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the dividend-ratio. 
Market-to-Book (-) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate 
the real impact from this variable on the dividend-ratio. 
Sales growth (+) – As the variable has a very low significance level it is hard to estimate the 
real impact from this variable on the dividend-ratio. 
Description of coefficients in table 6, crisis 
Excess cash (+) – Increases in excess cash result in a dividend-ratio increase. 
EBIT-ratio (-) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a dividend-ratio decrease. 
Market-to-Book (-) – Increases in market-to-book results in a dividend-ratio decrease. 
Sales growth (-) – Increases in sales growth result in a dividend-ratio decrease. 
Description of coefficients in table 6, post-crisis 
Excess cash (-) – Increases in excess cash result in a dividend-ratio decrease. 
EBIT-ratio (+) – Increases in EBIT-ratio result in a dividend-ratio increase. 
Variable Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
C -31.90684 0.041379 -0.013011
Prob. 0.2501 0.0000 0.0000
EXCESS CASH -13.37807 0.005563 -0.015611
Prob. 0.2404 0.0000 0.0000
EBIT RATIO 0.98992 -0.001978 0.01134
Prob. 0.1598 0.0000 0.0000
MB RATIO -0.055574 -0.000607 0.000469
Prob. 0.2972 0.0000 0.0000
SALES GROWTH 0.00207 -0.000132 -0.016349
Prob. 0.5465 0.0000 0.0000
Adjusted R-square 0.061064 0.67972 0.796398
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 11641 3340 3343
Firm dummy Yes Yes Yes
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes
Dividend-ratio
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Market-to-Book (+) – Increases in market-to-book result in a dividend-ratio increase. 
Sales growth (-) – Increases in sales growth result in a dividend-ratio decrease. 
4.2.3 Dividend-ratio regression summary 
The findings in Table 6 show that in the pre-crisis period the dividend-ratio has a positive 
connection to EBIT-ratio and sales growth while excess cash and a negative correlation with 
the market-to-book ratio. However none of the variables are significant at the 5 % 
significance level. During the crisis the excess cash variable changes to having a positive 
coefficient while EBIT-ratio and sales growth both change to having a negative one. In this 
period all variables have  significant impacts on the dependant variable. After the crisis the 
only two variables with  negative impacts on the dividend-ratio are sales growth and excess 
cash. All variables still have significant impacts.  
4.3 Step 3 findings 
Table 7 The regressions with changes in the market value as the dependent variable for all three periods, with 
periodical fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). All variables are measured as 
percentage changes from the previous year. For a more detailed version please see Table A87-A89 in appendix 
section 8.9. 
 
Description of coefficients in table 7, pre-crisis 
R&D (+) – As the variable has a very low significant level it is hard to estimate the real 
impact from this variable on the market value 
Variable Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
C 0.142971 0.030954 0.063247
Prob. 0.0000 0.6610 0.0000
RD 1.68E-06 -1.04E-06 9.47E-07
Prob. 0.7130 0.0204 0.0078
CAPEX -1.19E-06 -9.59E-05 4.84E-06
Prob. 0.4922 0.1094 0.0000
DIV -8.32E-07 -1.54E-06 -1.57E-06
Prob. 0.0415 0.0159 0.0000
MB 0.001096 0.125327 0.000244
Prob. 0.0482 0.0000 0.0000
SIZE 1.005805 3.439391 4.572419
Prob. 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
BETA -0.007943 0.050674 0.001011
Prob. 0.6541 0.4734 0.9005
Adjusted R-square 0.657232 0.432946 0.206415
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
N 11799 3323 3295
Firm dummy No No No
Period dummy Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors Yes Yes Yes
Market value
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CAPEX (-) – As for the R&D, the variable has a very low significant level and it is hard to 
estimate the real impact from this variable on the market value 
Dividends (-) – Increases in dividend payments are in the long run perceived negative by the 
market and results in a lower market value. 
Market-to-Book (+) – Increases in the market to book ratio results in a market value increase. 
Size (+) - Changes in size has a significant strong and positive correlation with market value. 
Beta (-) – The effect of beta is hard to estimate as this variable is strongly insignificant and 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. Due to this model, there is no proof that the beta 
influences changes in market value. 
Description of coefficients in table 7, crisis 
R&D (-) – Indicates that increases in R&D  during the crisis years are perceived negative by 
the market and result in a reduced market value. 
CAPEX (-) – Indicates that increases in capital expenditures have a negative impact on the 
market value, however this impact is not significant at the 5 % significance level. 
Dividends (-) – Increases in dividend payments are perceived negative by the market and 
result in a lower market value. 
Market-to-Book (+) – Increases in the market to book ratio result in a market value increase. 
Size (+) - Changes in size has a significant strong and positive correlation with market value. 
Beta (+) – As in the pre-crisis regression, the effect of beta is hard to estimate as the variable 
is strongly insignificant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. There is no proof that beta 
affects the market value. 
Description of coefficients in table 7, post-crisis 
R&D (+) – In this period R&D has a significant and positive correlation with the market 
value. 
CAPEX (+) – CAPEX increases has, as the R&D variable a positive and significant 
correlation with the market value.  
Dividends (-) – Increases in dividend payments are in the long run perceived negative by the 
market and result in a lower market value. 
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Market-to-Book (+) – Increases in the market to book ratio result in a market value increase. 
Size (+) - Changes in size have a significant strong and positive correlation with market value. 
Beta (+) – As in the previous regressions, we cannot prove any correlation between beta and 
market value changes. The variable is not significant at the 5% significance level. 
4.3.1 Regression summary 
As we can see in table 7, both R&D and CAPEX change impact between the different 
periods; from being strongly uncorrelated and insignificant during the pre-crisis years to be 
negative during the crisis years and positive during the post-crisis years. The dividend impact 
seems to have a significant negative impact on the market value throughout the different 
regressions and time periods. We can also see that the change in market-to-book ratio and 
change in size variables have a positive impact on the market value throughout the periods, 
but we cannot prove any correlation between the beta and market reactions. That R&D and 
CAPEX change both significance and impact during the different periods show that the 
markets view on expenditure reduction is depending on the economic state and condition. The 
market-to-book and size variables remain positive throughout the periods indicating that the 
market looks positively on increased growth prospects independent from economic 
conditions, but has the strongest impact during periods of limited positive investment 
opportunities. 
Table 8 Shows the means in the variables as well as number of firms for the eight clusters used in the pre-crisis 
period. 
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster R&D CAPEX DIV BETA MB SIZE MV
Mean -0.424100 219.368711 8168.556478 0.770990 13.446566 12.915700 5.308293
N 176 176 172 174 176 176 174
Mean 0.429627 -0.418819 11992.949930 0.942102 16.958963 13.297335 2.267500
N 262 262 259 260 262 262 262
Mean -0.502887 -0.437933 -0.482814 1.141572 16.506658 12.409563 12.876658
N 426 426 426 421 426 426 424
Mean -0.497180 82.862026 -0.516508 0.966719 8.435821 11.891960 6.854034
N 285 284 285 285 284 285 285
Mean 929.906378 -0.466280 7622.836632 1.536931 27.985584 12.500442 0.876955
N 145 145 143 145 145 145 145
Mean 2285.163472 -0.404164 -0.423082 1.325419 30.038714 12.398462 1.398203
N 153 154 154 154 154 154 154
Mean 1923.753625 6.679670 6151.988015 1.021095 15.858673 12.807852 11.027826
N 124 127 124 128 127 128 128
Mean 1339.582041 34.668033 -0.461808 1.338390 10.432506 12.327084 5.063118
N 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Mean 524.714924 39.374567 3769.906477 1.099399 16.621212 12.542940 6.669278
N 1696 1699 1688 1692 1699 1701 1697
6
7
8
Pre-crisis
1
2
3
4
5
Total
43 
 
Table 9 Shows the means in the variables as well as number of firms for the eight clusters used in the crisis 
period. 
 
 
 
Table 10 Shows the means in the variables as well as number of firms for the eight clusters used in the post-crisis 
period. 
 
4.3.3 Step 3 tables summary 
In step three we have also divided all the companies into different clusters depending on 
whether they decreased/increased their R&D, CAPEX and dividend payments during the 
three different periods. This was done to see how the companies’ market values changed 
depending on how they changed their expenses. The results can be seen in Table 8-10. During 
the pre-crisis period the four most successful clusters (measured as highest increase/lowest 
decrease in market value) during this period are cluster 3, 7, 4 and 1. During the other two 
periods the most successful clusters are 2, 3, 4 and 6.   
Cluster R&D CAPEX DIV BETA MB SIZE MV
Mean -0.129140 49.335240 0.252077 1.058342 1.029171 13.374251 0.403637
N 74 73 73 74 74 74 74
Mean -0.189920 -0.399638 13.855126 1.099732 1.549866 13.277236 0.723449
N 289 289 289 288 288 289 284
Mean -0.221747 -0.411394 -0.293517 1.103381 2.051691 12.524937 0.871673
N 239 239 239 236 236 239 235
Mean -0.223434 0.711705 -0.282926 1.477132 2.738566 12.076108 0.917513
N 67 67 67 66 66 67 67
Mean 13.540020 -0.361559 105.552989 1.018179 3.009890 12.888931 0.617080
N 420 422 421 421 421 422 419
Mean 19.959498 -0.391230 -0.387403 0.993007 3.496503 12.787539 0.839397
N 191 194 194 193 193 194 193
Mean 32.414599 0.919732 94.438110 1.178904 4.057916 12.906973 0.425052
N 298 299 298 297 296 299 297
Mean 0.596326 0.980647 -0.290877 1.169373 4.588960 12.625087 0.705392
N 117 117 117 117 117 116 116
Mean 11.266066 2.115645 44.996821 1.099399 2.878278 12.866460 0.670784
N 1695 1700 1698 1692 1691 1700 1685
1
2
Crisis
5
6
7
8
4
Total
3
Cluster R&D CAPEX DIV BETA MB SIZE MV
Mean -0.115962 0.711296 1655.987060 0.955190 6.891875 13.451384 -0.067363
N 201 201 196 200 201 201 200
Mean -0.181706 -0.257159 597.017550 1.178666 13.511647 13.182319 -0.050648
N 153 153 152 152 153 153 153
Mean -0.221538 -0.282814 -0.176220 1.095658 10.225015 12.804221 -0.046439
N 275 275 275 274 275 275 272
Mean -0.163673 0.889256 -0.185238 1.034925 7.184870 12.813753 -0.044087
N 416 416 416 416 416 416 414
Mean 6.448455 -0.326426 791.009100 1.213502 13.393234 12.471405 -0.224495
N 91 92 91 91 92 92 92
Mean 13.962305 -0.261487 -0.170679 1.221290 6.429422 12.681989 -0.058975
N 93 94 94 93 94 94 93
Mean 224.184783 0.865654 776.067943 1.067779 15.015079 13.183498 -0.127328
N 214 214 212 212 215 215 212
Mean 35.133762 1.053132 -0.145944 1.216029 10.395096 13.101876 -0.081016
N 254 255 255 254 254 254 255
Mean 34.534297 0.467629 385.362444 1.099399 9.975573 12.984770 -0.074450
N 1697 1700 1691 1692 1700 1700 1691
2
3
4
5
1
Post-crisis
8
Total
6
7
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5.0 Analysis 
In this chapter we finally analyze our findings from Chapter 4. We use previous literature as 
a base for our discussions and come to various conclusions that we summarize in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Step 1 analysis 
In Table 2 we can see that the firms increase their cash holdings throughout the three different 
periods. Pettit’s (2007) reasoning about cash as “dry powder for growth”; that firms use their 
cash holdings to support growth when there are opportunities for it, are hard to fit into our 
findings as the cash ratio are steadily increasing even during the crisis and post-crisis periods. 
This could be a signal that firms actually reject growth investment and positive NPV projects 
on the basis that they don’t want to use their cash holdings,  which makes many of the 
benefits of holding cash perish.  
In opposite to Culp’s (2006) risk financing motive we cannot see any recoil downwards to the 
pre-crisis level of cash in the post-crisis period, even though this is a steadier state with easier 
access to external capital markets and less volatility. In the same way it is hard to apply Opler 
et al.’s (1999) reasoning; that firms works toward a fixed cash level, we do not find any data 
that suggests that the sample companies corrects any deviation from the pre-crisis level of 
cash. Bates (2009) speaks of a decrease in idiosyncratic risk after 2004 that would, in the long 
run, lead to lower levels of cash-holdings among firms. However the 2008 crisis might have 
changed this and made the risk increase again which could be the reason why we see 
increasing cash holdings once more. However, why the cash holdings don’t adjust back to the 
pre-crisis levels cannot be explained by this, as the risk decreases in the post-crisis period 
parallel to increases in cash level.  This indicates that the change is of a structural and of a 
long term nature.  
 Another contradiction in our thesis to Opler et al.’s (1999) findings; that small companies 
would hold more cash than big companies, as can be seen in Table 1 we find that firm size has 
a significant and positive correlation with liquid asset holdings, which indicate that bigger 
firms hold more cash than smaller firms. In most cases the cost of cash is high, which makes 
the companies weighted cost of capital (WACC ) increase. Unlike the smaller firms the large 
sized firms, in general, have more stable cash flows and greater  abilities to hold capital 
structures with more expensive cost of capital to meet investors’ preferences, maintaining a 
good credit profile or gaining competitive advantages. However, we also find that firms with 
high market-to-book ratios and cash flow riskiness have significantly big and positive 
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correlation with liquid asset holdings, indicating that firms with strong growth prospects and 
risky cash flows hold more cash as a buffer to support the fluctuations in their cash flows.  
The question of however the dividend policy is a signaling tool that helps companies “back on 
track” can also be questioned. We see that the mean dividend ratio decreases in the crisis 
period but we cannot see any fast reinstatement of the old dividend policy. What we see 
however, is that more firms pay dividends during and post crisis time, which could be an 
indication that companies who didn’t pay dividends in the pre-crisis years try to use the 
dividend signaling tool to access the market, meanwhile the companies that have a history of 
paying dividends reduces their payments. In contradiction to the findings of Song and Lee 
(2011) we cannot see that the dividend reduction is temporary and adjusted back to pre-crisis 
levels after the crisis but instead actually decreases even more in the post-crisis years, 
indicating new, non-temporary and more restricted dividend policies. 
As we see in Table 3, our findings are also in line with Campello et al.’s (2010) survey who 
states that financially constrained firms would be cutting R&D, CAPEX and dividend 
payments during the crisis, Han and Qiu (2007) that provide evidence that investments would 
decrease as a result of more cash-flow volatility and Duchin et al. (2010) that come to the 
conclusion that corporate investments declined during the crisis.  
The positive correlation, in Table 1, between the CAPEX variable and liquid asset holdings 
also strengthens Baum et al’s (2012) findings; that CAPEX intensive firms accumulate cash to 
support their investments to a larger extent than firms that have less intensive investments of 
this sort. This is also an indication that the problem of managerial incentives and the cookie-
jar problem are matters that are needed to be taken into account.   
5.2 Step 2 analysis 
5.2.1 Variable analysis 
R&D-ratio 
The R&D-ratio regression for the pre-crisis period(Table 4) tell us that startup firms with 
good future growth opportunities (measured as market-to-book ratio) but low current earnings 
(low EBIT-ratio and negative sales growth) typically tend to increase their R&D-ratio 
accordingly. This lead us to conclude that the typical high intensive R&D firm is still in the 
development phase and has not yet started to conduct business that implies revenues, but that 
they have good predictions to do so. This pattern continuous during the crisis period but after 
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the post-crisis period the market-to-book ratio shifts to a negative value. This indicates that 
high market-to-book firms have decreased their investments in R&D in the post crisis period. 
Parallels can be drawn from the evidence provided by Bergeron and Zutters (2010) regarding 
US-firms’ decreasing risk-seeking behavior post implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
(SOX).  The increased pressure from internal controls can be compared to the increased 
monitoring from the investors and lenders, demanding less risky investments which cause the 
high market-to-book companies to restrict their R&D expenditures.  Another reason for this 
could be that these high growth firms simply can’t finance investments in R&D (which is in 
most cases intangible assets in the form of human capital) to the same extent as in the pre-
crisis period. Simply put, the market (lenders as well as investors) might find these 
investments risky, which would be a reason for the high growth firms to avoid or decrease 
these kinds of expenses. In the regressions we can also see that the excess cash variable turns 
from having a positive impact on R&D-ratio before the crisis, to having a smaller positive 
impact during the crisis and finally turn to having a negative impact in the post-crisis period. 
These changes indicate that the firms in the pre-crisis period would use their excess cash to 
investments in R&D. However, in the post-crisis period they would instead decrease R&D 
expenses to improve their level of excess cash, possibly in an effort to reduce distress costs.  
CAPEX-ratio 
When instead looking at the regressions for the CAPEX-ratio in Table 5 we can see that they 
differ some from the R&D-ratio regressions. What is recurrent in every period is that the 
excess cash is negatively correlated with the capital expenditures; for every penny a company 
puts in the treasure chest, the investments in CAPEX shrinks with a certain amount.   While 
the results from the R&D regressions indicated that R&D-heavy firms often are small startup 
firms with low earnings but high possible future earnings, the coefficients for the explaining 
variables in the pre-crisis CAPEX regression indicate that the CAPEX intensive firms have 
reached the next level and started doing business and make revenues. The market-to-book 
ratio and sales growth variables both have positive correlations with the dependent variable 
during the pre-periods which indicate that the typical CAPEX heavy firm has high growth 
opportunities. Their current amounts of earnings are low (shown by the low EBIT-ratio) but 
they are swiftly increasing these earnings with their high sales growth and the need to keep on 
investing, in order to keep the pace up, is large. We can see an interesting shift during the 
crisis; the market-to-book ratios correlation coefficient changes and becomes negative. In the 
post-crisis period the market-to-book ratio coefficient remains negative while the EBIT-ratio 
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becomes positive. This indicates that the growth opportunities have decreased as a result of 
the crisis and that this has put investment constraints on the firms; it is mainly companies that 
have actual earnings (measured as high EBIT-ratio) that can keep investing in CAPEX. 
Dividend-ratio 
For the dividend-ratio regressions we turn to Table 6. In the pre-crisis period we can’t see any 
significant connections between the dividend-ratio and any of the explaining variables. 
However looking at the regression for the crisis period, where the coefficients are negative for 
EBIT, market-to-book and sales growth,  lead us to the conclusion that it is mature companies 
in mature industries with low future growth opportunities who pay out dividends, which is in 
accordance with Pettit’s (2007) previous studies. Many of these mature firms might have a 
long pattern of paying dividends and therefore it is much harder for them to cut back on these 
even during a crisis, as Charitou et al. (2010) has shown in their research. After the crisis we 
see that both the market-to-book ratio and EBIT-ratio shift to having a positive impact on the 
dividend-ratio. The positive correlation indicates that firms in less mature industries with 
more growth opportunities start paying dividends. As we saw in Table 2 and 3, the number of 
dividend paying firms increased, meanwhile the overall dividend-ratio dropped.  This could 
be due to more high market-to-book firms with growth potential using dividends as a 
signaling tool in the post-crisis years. Ogden (2003) speaks of the importance of signaling in 
an environment with high information asymmetry, which could be said that the crisis and 
post-crisis market are and which the constrained growth firms try to mitigate. By observing 
the relatively low explaining level of the pre-crisis table compared to the crisis and post-crisis 
table we acknowledge that the influences of the explaining variables increase and are very 
deterministic in the two later regressions, and that there might be other factors that explain the 
variation in the dividend ratio in the pre-crisis period. We can also see the same pattern 
between excess cash and dividend-ratio as we could see between excess cash and R&D-ratio. 
From having a positive connection during the crisis it changes to having a negative impact on 
dividend-ratio in the post-crisis period. This once again indicates that firms adopted a more 
conservative cash holding policy after the crisis where they increased excess cash on behalf of 
dividend payments. 
Overall analysis 
Song and Lee (2012) talk about a more conservative approach to cash holdings among firms 
after a severe financial crisis. We believe that our findings are in line with those thoughts, that 
firms indeed adopt a more conservative policy which results in increased cash holdings on 
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behalf of reduced research and development expenses, capital expenditures and dividend 
payouts. We see that the CAPEX-ratio is negatively affected by increased excess cash 
holdings throughout the different time periods, that the R&D-ratio coefficient changes from 
being positive in the pre-crisis period, to be less positive in the crisis period and ending up 
with a negative value in the post-crisis period. The dividend ratio correlation to excess cash is 
hard to draw any conclusions from in the pre-crisis period but has a positive and significant 
impact during the crisis and a negative impact in the post-crisis period.  
The accumulation of cash on behalf of these expenditures, especially the R&D and CAPEX, 
could be seen as strong warning signals. If Griliches (1986) and Piergiovanni and Santorelli’s 
(2010) findings that emphasizes the importance of R&D and CAPEX as high value creators 
are correct, this could indicate a problem for the future. If the long-term effect of investing in 
R&D and CAPEX is equal to higher revenues in the future then investing a portion of your 
current cash-holdings into these items would be strongly rational, as the NPV of cash holdings 
are very low. 
Simutin (2010) find that firms with excess cash increase their future investment rate, which is 
the opposite to our and Song and Lee’s findings. Simutin (2010) argues that the companies 
build these cash reserves for future investment opportunities, however due to our limited 
amount of years in the post-crisis period it is hard to determine whether these investment 
opportunities has occurred yet.  With this in mind it is possible that our results would be more 
in line with Simutin’s findings, if the time frame for the post-crisis period was extended.  
We can conclude this analysis by saying that the findings in step 2 strengthen the results in 
step 1; that the R&D and capital expenditures is steadily shrinking over the periods alongside 
with the accumulation of cash. These findings give rational reasons to investigate step 3; to 
find out how the market views these expenditure cuts. 
5.3 Step 3 analysis 
Regression analysis 
For step 3 we look at Table 7. That the increased dividend payments seem to have a negative 
impact throughout the different periods contradicts the findings of Ogden (2003) and Charitou 
et al. (2010). We do not see any negative reaction in market price when dividends are 
reduced. Lang and Litzenberger’s (1988) theory; that dividend payment reduces the 
overinvestment problem which is reflected by a higher market value, is hard to apply to our 
findings. In the same manner we can’t find anything that supports the view on dividends as a 
49 
 
strong signaling tool as the market reacts negative to any increase in this type of expenditure. 
Our findings are more in line with Pettit’s (2007) thesis; that if there is any correlation 
between dividends and firm value it is negative, as there are mostly large sized and mature 
companies that pay dividends. As we can see in Tables 8-10 the clusters with high size values 
are least likely to reduce their dividends.   
Pre-crisis R&D increases have positive impact on firm value, the market’s view during this 
period is in line with the research made by Sueyoshi and Goto (2010); that R&D have a 
positive impact on firm value, but the negative coefficient for CAPEX contradicts that part of 
their findings. Due to the low significance level we cannot draw any bigger conclusions from 
this. However, during the crisis the market’s view regarding these types of 
expenditures/investments change and the impacts of these variables on the firm value 
becomes negative. During this type of economic condition, the market seems to prefer a more 
conservative approach with a reduction of these types of investments. After the crisis the view 
on these expenditures changes back to being positive again for the firm value. The correlation 
coefficient for the R&D-variable in the post-crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period is 
somewhat lower which indicate a bit more restrictive view. The CAPEX correlation is 
however larger, indicating a stronger belief in performance in this field. Meanwhile the R&D 
performance is in large extent built on own innovation and progress and is perceived as more 
risky, CAPEX are safer investments that enhances the firms productivity. With a severe crisis 
more companies than usual go into bankruptcy and experience different financial difficulties. 
The survivors of the crisis with economical potential can grow on the behalf of the non-
survivor’s market share and acquire possible assets at discounted prices. Both CAPEX and 
R&D expenses can be seen as expenses today for higher earnings in the future, as in line with 
Sueyoshi and Goto (2010), when there are no imminent threats to the survival of the 
company, investors once again see these investments as a good long term solution. This can 
also be an explanation for the negative impact of the dividends at any given time. The rational 
reason behind dividend payments is that the company itself has no good investment 
opportunities. During the crisis years, the market’s view could be that the companies need to 
maintain this cash within the companies to strengthen their liquidity, and in the post crisis 
time the market probably recognize the positive investment opportunities. In the pre-crisis 
period the case could be as earlier stated, that there are usually mature companies with limited 
growth opportunities that pay dividends, which makes the correlation with market value 
negative. 
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When comparing the coefficients within the same period we can see that the only variable to 
have a significant impact on the company value is the dividend-ratio. If a company chooses to 
decrease dividends this would most likely result in a positive market reaction and an increase 
in market value, meanwhile the outcomes of reduced capital expenditures and investments in 
research and development are highly uncertain. In the crisis period increases in capital 
expenditures have the most negative correlation with market value which means that a 
reduction in this item is viewed most favorable upon by the market. Dividend increases are 
the variable with the second most negative correlation followed by the R&D ratio. In the post-
crisis period all variables except dividend have positive correlations with market value; 
research and development has the smallest positive correlation and capital expenditures has 
the highest. This lead us to the conclusion that regardless which economic state, the market 
always prefer reductions in dividend payments. If the primary target for the company is to 
maintain a high market value in the crisis times, it should reduce all expenditures and 
investments, with a focus on the capital expenditures. In the post crisis times they should be 
aware of negative market reactions if it chooses to reduce anything else than dividend 
payments. The reduction of capital expenditures is the cut-back that the market looks most 
heavily negative upon, so if the company has no dividends, wants to maintain a strong market 
value and have strong incentives to bunker cash, the R&D investments are the item with least 
negative impact on the firm’s market value. 
Tables analysis 
For the table analysis we look at Tables 8-10. In the pre-crisis period the fact that the cluster 
that decreased all expenses (number 3) and the cluster that increased all expenses (number 7) 
can be found on the top four list makes it hard to draw any conclusions from the table. 
However during and after the crisis it becomes clearer that in times of high distress the 
companies that decrease their expenses have the highest increase (or lowest decrease) in their 
market value. During both of these periods cluster 2, 3, 4 and 6 are the top four performing 
clusters. All these clusters that reduced two or three categories of expenses.   
Consistently throughout all periods we can see that the larger firms can be found in clusters 
that do not reduce dividend payouts. This works well with Pettit’s (2007) statement (as well 
as our own findings in step two) that the companies who pay out dividends are often large, 
mature companies. Since dividends are "stickier" according to Song and Lee’s (2012) 
research (seen in that dividend paying firms tend to reduce investments more than non-
dividend paying firms in time of crisis) than R&D and CAPEX it is only natural that 
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companies with large dividend payouts decrease other expenses first. This is especially true 
the longer they have been paying dividends as Charitou et al. (2010) state. 
Overall the fact that the best performing clusters are the ones that reduced as many expenses 
as possible during the crisis works well with both Song and Lee’s (2012) and Bargeron et al.’s 
(2010) findings that companies, when in need of risk reduction, increase cash by decreasing 
investments and other expenses. The market evidently looks at this risk reducing behavior 
kindly and we can see that these firms have the highest market value increase (or lowest 
decrease) during the crisis and post-crisis periods when there is a lot of uncertainty on the 
market.  
Piergiovanni and Santorelli (2010) comes to the conclusion that capital expenditures are value 
driving for the firms, which we can see evidence of during the pre-crisis period. In this 
particular period we see that the two worst performing clusters are clusters that have reduced 
capital expenditures (cluster 5 and 6) and in the four best performing clusters, three are 
clusters that increased these expenditures (cluster 1, 4 and 7). However during and after the 
crisis no pattern like this can be seen, instead the expense reducing clusters are more 
successful, as mentioned above. This indicates that CAPEX have an important role to play for 
value creation in a company but during times of high uncertainty this value creating effect 
decreases. Instead a more conservative, expense reducing behavior is in demand by the 
investors.    
Although Piergiovanni and Santorelli (2010) talk about a connection between CAPEX and 
R&D working together to create values for the firm, we could not see any clear signs of this in 
our analysis of the eight clusters. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
In Chapter 6 we summarize our findings and come to various conclusions. We end this 
chapter by giving suggestions for interesting further research in our field of work. 
The first question to be answered in our thesis was whether the firm´s cash holdings changed 
during and after the economic downturn that followed the credit crunch in 2008. We found 
statistical secure evidence that firms indeed increased their cash holdings throughout the 
different periods. We also identified several issues and motives regarding cash holdings.  
The second question to be answered was how the research and development, capital 
expenditures and dividend payments was affected by these changes. We identified an overall 
decrease in all of the mentioned variables throughout the different periods. In step 2 we found 
evidence that strengthened our findings in step 1. Namely that firms indeed increased their 
excess cash holdings on behalf of capital expenditures, R&D expenses and dividend payments 
in the post-crisis period. Excess cash was negatively correlated to CAPEX throughout the 
different periods, while the correlation with R&D-ratio had a reduced positive impact when 
moving from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. This once again led us to the conclusion 
that US firms adopted a more conservative cash holding policy during and after the crisis. We 
also identified some key characteristics of the dividend, R&D, and CAPEX-heavy firms. 
Since we identified an impact on the different examined expenditures, the third question to be 
addressed was whether the market perceived one way of change in expenditure policy over 
another. From the regressions made we found that the market’s view on the different 
expenditures differ substantially from one period to another. In the pre-crisis period we could 
only identify a significant impact on market value from dividends, indicating that the market 
took the other expenditures into account in a very limited extent in the valuation process. In 
the crisis period we identified a negative correlation between all expenditures and the market 
value, giving a clear indication of the market preferences in this period. In the post-crisis 
period we saw a positive relationship between the capital expenditures and research and 
development investments and the market value, indicating a more positive view regarding 
these expenditures. The dividends were significantly negatively correlated with the market 
value in every period meaning that there is never a bad time to decrease dividends, if a high 
market value is the primary target. In the crisis times the CAPEX-ratio had the most negative 
correlation with the market value, indicating that this was the primary item that the market 
wished to see reductions in. In the post-crisis period R&D was the most favorable item to 
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reduce from a market point of view (if it's not possible to decrease dividends which is 
negatively correlated as mentioned above). It is positive to reduce all payments in the crisis 
period and in the post crisis the last item that should be reduced would be the capital 
expenditures.  
We also clustered the companies within the sample to be able to analyze the characteristics of 
the companies that chose a certain way to handle their expenditures and the market outcome 
of this action. In the pre-crisis period we could not see any clear patterns, but during and after 
the crisis the most successful clusters were those that decreased expenses. We were also able 
to see signs of reluctance among large firms to reduce dividends payments in our step 3 
tables.  
6.1 Further research  
This paper’s main focus is the market’s reactions regarding cuts in investments and 
expenditures. The only consequence to be examined is therefore the market reactions and the 
effects on market value. It would be of highest interest to investigate the long term effects of 
cutting these expenditures and investments. Especially cuts in vital functions like research and 
development and capital expenditures (even during crisis times) could have negative 
consequences for the company in the future, which maybe isn’t acknowledged by the market 
in crisis times as it only tries to put out the worst fires by accumulating cash. The market 
reactions are only based on discounted cash flows and predictions of the companies’ future 
performance; therefore it would be highly interesting to look at the true long term 
consequences for the company value. 
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8.0 Appendix  
In this Appendix section we provide all the detailed regressions and all other tests described in the methodology section of this thesis. First of all 
we have the Regression test summary in section 8.1 that gives a brief overview of all the test results performed on the different regressions. For 
more detailed descriptions, please see section 8.2-8.9 in this Appendix. 
8.1 Regression tests summary 
Table A1 Shows the results from the different tests performed on every regression used in the analysis. A prob of < 0.05 means that we reject the null-hypotisis. For a more 
detailed description of the different tests we refer you to chapter 3.0 in the thesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regressions Heteroskedasticity (Prob) Likelihood-ratio CS (Prob) Likelihood-ratio period (Prob) Hausman CS (Prob) Hausman period (Prob) Normality Multicollinearity
Step 1: Whole period 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 No No
Step 2: R&D pre-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.8774 0.0000 0.8595 No No
Step 2: R&D crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 NA No No
Step 2: R&D post-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.2306 0.0000 NA No No
Step 2: CAPEX pre-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0000 0.0002 No No
Step 2: CAPEX crisis 0.0325 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 NA No No
Step 2: CAPEX post-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.0486 0.0001 NA No No
Step 2: DIV pre-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.2139 0.0000 0.1093 No No
Step 2: DIV crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.0046 0.0000 NA No No
Step 2: DIV post-crisis 0.0000 0.0000 0.1286 0.0000 NA No No
Step 3: Pre-crisis 0.6528 0.7116 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 No No
Step 3: Crisis 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NA No No
Step 3: Post-crisis 0.1253 1.0000 0.0000 0.1037 NA No No
II 
 
8.2 Heteroskedasticity 
8.2.1 Step 1 Heteroskedasticity test 
Table A2 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the step 1 regression or if we need 
to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RESID01^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 1696   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 18136  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.627128 0.209042 26.91871 0.0000 
CAPEX -0.387919 0.053693 -7.224783 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.078591 0.049391 -1.591215 0.1116 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS -1.157606 0.122687 -9.435450 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.184995 0.065921 -2.806333 0.0050 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS -0.003830 0.000665 -5.758348 0.0000 
FIRM_SIZE -0.241291 0.016185 -14.90830 0.0000 
LEVERAGE 0.074560 0.025953 2.872926 0.0041 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.019203 0.000754 25.46986 0.0000 
WC -0.530414 0.018483 -28.69710 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.156294    Mean dependent var 2.134933 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155876    S.D. dependent var 4.286832 
S.E. of regression 3.938580    Akaike info criterion 5.580069 
Sum squared resid 281178.0    Schwarz criterion 5.584373 
Log likelihood -50590.06    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.581484 
F-statistic 373.0888    Durbin-Watson stat 0.896109 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
8.2.2 Step 2 Heteroskedasticity test 
Table A3 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, pre crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RDRESIDPRE^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 1.449174 0.139306 10.40278 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.441407 0.046123 9.570264 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.372334 0.016129 -23.08483 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.062193 0.001646 37.78254 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000357 0.000340 -1.049332 0.2940 
     
     R-squared 0.258755     Mean dependent var 1.099705 
Adjusted R-squared 0.258500     S.D. dependent var 9.674396 
S.E. of regression 8.330660     Akaike info criterion 7.078192 
Sum squared resid 807537.2     Schwarz criterion 7.081354 
Log likelihood -41193.62     Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.079254 
F-statistic 1015.478     Durbin-Watson stat 0.747757 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A4 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RDRESIDCRISIS^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.061614 0.215528 0.285874 0.7750 
EXCESS_CASH 0.063093 0.075078 0.840368 0.4008 
EBIT_RATIO -0.721067 0.032142 -22.43367 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.139199 0.006410 21.71443 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000724 0.000559 -1.293678 0.1959 
     
     R-squared 0.320712     Mean dependent var 0.838998 
Adjusted R-squared 0.319897     S.D. dependent var 7.696361 
S.E. of regression 6.347062     Akaike info criterion 6.535357 
Sum squared resid 134351.1     Schwarz criterion 6.544509 
Log likelihood -10909.05     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.538631 
F-statistic 393.6378     Durbin-Watson stat 0.465296 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A5 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, post-crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RDRESIDPOST^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.074121 0.170352 0.435104 0.6635 
EXCESS_CASH 0.076044 0.062142 1.223707 0.2211 
EBIT_RATIO -0.971884 0.036273 -26.79395 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.126557 0.003911 32.35927 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.132357 0.077075 1.717252 0.0860 
     
     R-squared 0.476864     Mean dependent var 0.730922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.476237     S.D. dependent var 7.073987 
S.E. of regression 5.119548     Akaike info criterion 6.105504 
Sum squared resid 87488.21     Schwarz criterion 6.114649 
Log likelihood -10200.35     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.108775 
F-statistic 760.6875     Durbin-Watson stat 0.820590 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A6 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, pre-crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: CAPEXRESIDPRE^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.312714 0.039237 7.969888 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.048277 0.012991 -3.716211 0.0002 
EBIT_RATIO 0.017995 0.004543 3.961091 0.0001 
M_B_RATIO 0.005855 0.000464 12.62933 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 1.74E-05 9.57E-05 0.182314 0.8553 
     
     R-squared 0.016045    Mean dependent var 0.494777 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015706    S.D. dependent var 2.365057 
S.E. of regression 2.346410    Akaike info criterion 4.544080 
Sum squared resid 64063.65    Schwarz criterion 4.547242 
Log likelihood -26443.82    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.545142 
F-statistic 47.43496    Durbin-Watson stat 0.743337 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A7 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: CAPEXRESIDCRISIS^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.354431 0.080420 4.407246 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.042253 0.028014 -1.508275 0.1316 
EBIT_RATIO -0.016435 0.011993 -1.370341 0.1707 
M_B_RATIO 0.004635 0.002392 1.937705 0.0527 
SALES_GROWTH -7.01E-05 0.000209 -0.336102 0.7368 
     
     R-squared 0.003148    Mean dependent var 0.482969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001953    S.D. dependent var 2.370597 
S.E. of regression 2.368282    Akaike info criterion 4.563703 
Sum squared resid 18705.21    Schwarz criterion 4.572855 
Log likelihood -7616.383    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.566977 
F-statistic 2.633069    Durbin-Watson stat 0.965265 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.032539    
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Table A8 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, post-crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: CAPEXRESIDPOST^2   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.073198 0.073630 0.994130 0.3202 
EXCESS_CASH -0.111105 0.026860 -4.136535 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.093283 0.015678 5.949992 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.011848 0.001690 7.008564 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.034654 0.033314 1.040228 0.2983 
     
     R-squared 0.023282    Mean dependent var 0.435838 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022111    S.D. dependent var 2.237678 
S.E. of regression 2.212800    Akaike info criterion 4.427889 
Sum squared resid 16344.46    Schwarz criterion 4.437034 
Log likelihood -7396.217    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.431161 
F-statistic 19.89186    Durbin-Watson stat 0.628504 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A9 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, pre-crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: DIVRESIDPRE^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -88743.95 8790.068 -10.09593 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -37749.60 2910.293 -12.97107 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 2174.762 1017.717 2.136902 0.0326 
M_B_RATIO -7.210692 103.8655 -0.069423 0.9447 
SALES_GROWTH 5.317838 21.44109 0.248021 0.8041 
     
     R-squared 0.014255     Mean dependent var 4977.563 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013916     S.D. dependent var 529351.1 
S.E. of regression 525654.9     Akaike info criterion 29.18311 
Sum squared resid 3.22E+15     Schwarz criterion 29.18627 
Log likelihood -169855.3     Hannan-Quinn criter. 29.18417 
F-statistic 42.06826     Durbin-Watson stat 1.167297 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A10 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: DIVRESIDCRISIS^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.073869 0.007697 9.596589 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.027016 0.002681 10.07547 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.001155 0.001148 -1.006416 0.3143 
M_B_RATIO 0.000147 0.000229 0.641605 0.5212 
SALES_GROWTH -8.22E-06 2.00E-05 -0.411770 0.6805 
     
     R-squared 0.031378     Mean dependent var 0.011654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.030216     S.D. dependent var 0.230183 
S.E. of regression 0.226679     Akaike info criterion -0.129068 
Sum squared resid 171.3635     Schwarz criterion -0.119915 
Log likelihood 220.5431     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.125794 
F-statistic 27.00860     Durbin-Watson stat 1.434230 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A11 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, post-crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: DIVRESIDPOST^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.000277 0.003798 0.073037 0.9418 
EXCESS_CASH 0.000235 0.001386 0.169772 0.8652 
EBIT_RATIO 0.001805 0.000809 2.232177 0.0257 
M_B_RATIO 0.001119 8.72E-05 12.83166 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.003708 0.001719 -2.157857 0.0310 
     
     R-squared 0.050890     Mean dependent var 0.008277 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049753     S.D. dependent var 0.117099 
S.E. of regression 0.114149     Akaike info criterion -1.501130 
Sum squared resid 43.49411     Schwarz criterion -1.491985 
Log likelihood 2514.139     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.497858 
F-statistic 44.74496     Durbin-Watson stat 0.769399 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.2.3 Step 3 Heteroscedacity Test 
Table A12 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 3, pre-
crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RESIDPRE^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1693  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11799 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.404140 0.218557 1.849123 0.0645 
RD 1.04E-05 0.000119 0.087405 0.9304 
CAPEX -2.37E-05 0.000450 -0.052717 0.9580 
DIV -8.01E-06 3.88E-05 -0.206600 0.8363 
MB 0.007072 0.009574 0.738701 0.4601 
SIZE -0.083203 0.176560 -0.471247 0.6375 
BETA 0.181319 0.097587 1.858025 0.0632 
     
     R-squared 0.000354     Mean dependent var 0.591250 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000155     S.D. dependent var 20.28559 
S.E. of regression 20.28716     Akaike info criterion 8.858446 
Sum squared resid 4853219.     Schwarz criterion 8.862822 
Log likelihood -52253.40     Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.859915 
F-statistic 0.696090     Durbin-Watson stat 1.261139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.652804    
     
     
 
Table A13 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 3, crisis, or 
if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RESID01CRISIS^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1690  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3323 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.383675 0.042195 9.092905 0.0000 
RD 4.28E-06 2.98E-05 0.143741 0.8857 
CAPEX 4.03E-05 0.000600 0.067176 0.9464 
DIV -3.53E-06 1.55E-05 -0.227600 0.8200 
MB 0.134108 0.022745 5.896127 0.0000 
SIZE 0.239793 1.590821 0.150736 0.8802 
BETA 0.191545 0.019227 9.962447 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.038512     Mean dependent var 0.598922 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036772     S.D. dependent var 2.174730 
S.E. of regression 2.134371     Akaike info criterion 4.356326 
Sum squared resid 15106.17     Schwarz criterion 4.369194 
Log likelihood -7231.035     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.360930 
F-statistic 22.13666     Durbin-Watson stat 1.990776 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A14 Heteroscedasticity test to see whether we have homoscedasticity in the regression for step 3, post-
crisis, or if we need to use robust standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: RESID01POST^2  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1689  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3295 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.115227 0.017398 6.623167 0.0000 
RD -9.93E-07 3.58E-06 -0.277491 0.7814 
CAPEX -1.36E-06 8.41E-06 -0.162081 0.8713 
DIV -2.19E-06 3.83E-06 -0.572542 0.5670 
MB 0.000128 0.000329 0.387903 0.6981 
SIZE 1.155492 0.774389 1.492133 0.1358 
BETA 0.019208 0.007521 2.553826 0.0107 
     
     R-squared 0.003030     Mean dependent var 0.140576 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001211     S.D. dependent var 0.855118 
S.E. of regression 0.854600     Akaike info criterion 2.525755 
Sum squared resid 2401.360     Schwarz criterion 2.538714 
Log likelihood -4154.181     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.530394 
F-statistic 1.665758     Durbin-Watson stat 2.033241 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.125266    
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8.3 Likelihood-ratio Test 
8.3.1 Step 1 Likelihood-ratio test 
Table A15 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 1. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 25.218645 (1695,16432) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 23237.883568 1695 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -1.760617 0.076002 -23.16555 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.542567 0.019700 27.54194 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.196687 0.018809 -10.45730 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.547469 0.025093 -21.81747 0.0000 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000767 0.000254 3.026030 0.0025 
FIRM_SIZE 0.070865 0.006155 11.51305 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.334325 0.009827 -34.02243 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.006097 0.000287 21.23300 0.0000 
WC -0.212808 0.007014 -30.34255 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.243466    Mean dependent var -1.158969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243132    S.D. dependent var 1.726241 
S.E. of regression 1.501798    Akaike info criterion 3.651699 
Sum squared resid 40883.58    Schwarz criterion 3.655573 
Log likelihood -33104.61    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.652973 
F-statistic 729.1975    Durbin-Watson stat 0.400513 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A16 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodical effects in the regression for step 1. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 20.158354 (10,18116) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 200.691565 10 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.504881 0.077572 -32.29106 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.369860 0.019925 18.56299 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.226316 0.018328 -12.34804 0.0000 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS 1.449211 0.045527 31.83182 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.502095 0.024462 -20.52543 0.0000 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000653 0.000247 2.644239 0.0082 
FIRM_SIZE 0.084708 0.006006 14.10385 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.370529 0.009631 -38.47415 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.005654 0.000280 20.20742 0.0000 
WC -0.191327 0.006859 -27.89512 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.283518    Mean dependent var -1.158969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283162    S.D. dependent var 1.726241 
S.E. of regression 1.461544    Akaike info criterion 3.597415 
Sum squared resid 38719.14    Schwarz criterion 3.601719 
Log likelihood -32611.36    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.598830 
F-statistic 796.9565    Durbin-Watson stat 0.402131 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.3.2 Step 2 Likelihood-ratio test 
Table A17 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 15.355829 (1697,9939) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 
14981.88043
0 1697 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.580939 0.017540 33.12133 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.146295 0.005807 25.19198 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.067391 0.002031 -33.18496 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.002779 0.000207 13.40778 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 9.13E-05 4.28E-05 2.135093 0.0328 
     
     R-squared 0.190914     Mean dependent var 0.259119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.190636     S.D. dependent var 1.165895 
S.E. of regression 1.048894     Akaike info criterion 2.933778 
Sum squared resid 12801.67     Schwarz criterion 2.936941 
Log likelihood -17071.06     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.934841 
F-statistic 686.4137     Durbin-Watson stat 0.460359 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table A18 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D as 
dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.403119 (6,11630) 0.8774 
Period Chi-square 2.420748 6 0.8772 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.580939 0.017540 33.12133 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.146295 0.005807 25.19198 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.067391 0.002031 -33.18496 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.002779 0.000207 13.40778 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 9.13E-05 4.28E-05 2.135093 0.0328 
     
     R-squared 0.190914     Mean dependent var 0.259119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.190636     S.D. dependent var 1.165895 
S.E. of regression 1.048894     Akaike info criterion 2.933778 
Sum squared resid 12801.67     Schwarz criterion 2.936941 
Log likelihood -17071.06     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.934841 
F-statistic 686.4137     Durbin-Watson stat 0.460359 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A19 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 11.391630 (1686,1649) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 8475.044631 1686 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.173140 0.031127 5.562367 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.043691 0.010843 4.029451 0.0001 
EBIT_RATIO -0.063292 0.004642 -13.63459 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.027057 0.000926 29.22577 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 8.24E-05 8.08E-05 1.020702 0.3075 
     
     R-squared 0.328803     Mean dependent var 0.243380 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327998     S.D. dependent var 1.118203 
S.E. of regression 0.916654     Akaike info criterion 2.665324 
Sum squared resid 2802.252     Schwarz criterion 2.674476 
Log likelihood -4446.090     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.668598 
F-statistic 408.4347     Durbin-Watson stat 0.382834 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A20 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D as 
dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 9.878110 (1,3334) 0.0017 
Period Chi-square 9.881256 1 0.0017 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.173140 0.031127 5.562367 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.043691 0.010843 4.029451 0.0001 
EBIT_RATIO -0.063292 0.004642 -13.63459 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.027057 0.000926 29.22577 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 8.24E-05 8.08E-05 1.020702 0.3075 
     
     R-squared 0.328803     Mean dependent var 0.243380 
Adjusted R-squared 0.327998     S.D. dependent var 1.118203 
S.E. of regression 0.916654     Akaike info criterion 2.665324 
Sum squared resid 2802.252     Schwarz criterion 2.674476 
Log likelihood -4446.090     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.668598 
F-statistic 408.4347     Durbin-Watson stat 0.382834 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A21 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D 
as dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 8.274378 (1684,1654) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 7499.379185 1684 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.267491 0.028469 9.395801 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.052444 0.010385 5.049824 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.127584 0.006062 -21.04699 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.011255 0.000654 17.21923 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.051422 0.012881 3.992124 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.281706     Mean dependent var 0.223458 
Adjusted R-squared 0.280845     S.D. dependent var 1.008903 
S.E. of regression 0.855580     Akaike info criterion 2.527420 
Sum squared resid 2443.472     Schwarz criterion 2.536565 
Log likelihood -4219.582     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.530691 
F-statistic 327.2799     Durbin-Watson stat 0.567415 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A21 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with R&D as 
dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1.437512 (1,3337) 0.2306 
Period Chi-square 1.439786 1 0.2302 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.267491 0.028469 9.395801 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.052444 0.010385 5.049824 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.127584 0.006062 -21.04699 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.011255 0.000654 17.21923 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.051422 0.012881 3.992124 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.281706     Mean dependent var 0.223458 
Adjusted R-squared 0.280845     S.D. dependent var 1.008903 
S.E. of regression 0.855580     Akaike info criterion 2.527420 
Sum squared resid 2443.472     Schwarz criterion 2.536565 
Log likelihood -4219.582     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.530691 
F-statistic 327.2799     Durbin-Watson stat 0.567415 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A22 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 18.530248 (1697,9939) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 16605.280914 1697 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.408876 0.011765 34.75378 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.016307 0.003895 4.186303 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.003915 0.001362 2.873877 0.0041 
M_B_RATIO 0.001614 0.000139 11.60876 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 3.49E-05 2.87E-05 1.216912 0.2237 
     
     R-squared 0.013995    Mean dependent var 0.385529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013656    S.D. dependent var 0.708409 
S.E. of regression 0.703555    Akaike info criterion 2.135088 
Sum squared resid 5759.699    Schwarz criterion 2.138250 
Log likelihood -12422.28    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.136150 
F-statistic 41.28981    Durbin-Watson stat 0.400604 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A23 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with CAPEX as 
dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 3.812351 (6,11630) 0.0008 
Period Chi-square 22.873252 6 0.0008 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.408876 0.011765 34.75378 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.016307 0.003895 4.186303 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.003915 0.001362 2.873877 0.0041 
M_B_RATIO 0.001614 0.000139 11.60876 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 3.49E-05 2.87E-05 1.216912 0.2237 
     
     R-squared 0.013995    Mean dependent var 0.385529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013656    S.D. dependent var 0.708409 
S.E. of regression 0.703555    Akaike info criterion 2.135088 
Sum squared resid 5759.699    Schwarz criterion 2.138250 
Log likelihood -12422.28    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.136150 
F-statistic 41.28981    Durbin-Watson stat 0.400604 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A24 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 7.279784 (1686,1649) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 7125.397892 1686 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.403095 0.023617 17.06834 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.017967 0.008227 2.183942 0.0290 
EBIT_RATIO 0.002101 0.003522 0.596519 0.5509 
M_B_RATIO 0.001853 0.000702 2.638455 0.0084 
SALES_GROWTH -5.62E-05 6.13E-05 -0.916828 0.3593 
     
     R-squared 0.004383    Mean dependent var 0.371824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003189    S.D. dependent var 0.696592 
S.E. of regression 0.695480    Akaike info criterion 2.113067 
Sum squared resid 1613.115    Schwarz criterion 2.122220 
Log likelihood -3523.822    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.116341 
F-statistic 3.670156    Durbin-Watson stat 0.501022 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005478    
     
     
 
Table A25 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with CAPEX as 
dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 12.393248 (1,3334) 0.0004 
Period Chi-square 12.392533 1 0.0004 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.403095 0.023617 17.06834 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.017967 0.008227 2.183942 0.0290 
EBIT_RATIO 0.002101 0.003522 0.596519 0.5509 
M_B_RATIO 0.001853 0.000702 2.638455 0.0084 
SALES_GROWTH -5.62E-05 6.13E-05 -0.916828 0.3593 
     
     R-squared 0.004383    Mean dependent var 0.371824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.003189    S.D. dependent var 0.696592 
S.E. of regression 0.695480    Akaike info criterion 2.113067 
Sum squared resid 1613.115    Schwarz criterion 2.122220 
Log likelihood -3523.822    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.116341 
F-statistic 3.670156    Durbin-Watson stat 0.501022 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.005478    
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Table A26 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with 
CAPEX as dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 13.345995 (1684,1654) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 8959.920564 1684 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.289832 0.021984 13.18390 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.009108 0.008019 -1.135757 0.2561 
EBIT_RATIO 0.025411 0.004681 5.428601 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.003268 0.000505 6.474642 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.031951 0.009946 3.212293 0.0013 
     
     R-squared 0.023251    Mean dependent var 0.345916 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022080    S.D. dependent var 0.668091 
S.E. of regression 0.660674    Akaike info criterion 2.010383 
Sum squared resid 1457.005    Schwarz criterion 2.019528 
Log likelihood -3355.355    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.013654 
F-statistic 19.86478    Durbin-Watson stat 0.288679 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A27 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with CAPEX as 
dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 3.892477 (1,3337) 0.0486 
Period Chi-square 3.897203 1 0.0484 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.289832 0.021984 13.18390 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.009108 0.008019 -1.135757 0.2561 
EBIT_RATIO 0.025411 0.004681 5.428601 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.003268 0.000505 6.474642 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.031951 0.009946 3.212293 0.0013 
     
     R-squared 0.023251    Mean dependent var 0.345916 
Adjusted R-squared 0.022080    S.D. dependent var 0.668091 
S.E. of regression 0.660674    Akaike info criterion 2.010383 
Sum squared resid 1457.005    Schwarz criterion 2.019528 
Log likelihood -3355.355    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.013654 
F-statistic 19.86478    Durbin-Watson stat 0.288679 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A28 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 1.339373 (1697,9939) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 2397.415328 1697 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -11.77451 1.180030 -9.978141 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -5.016587 0.390695 -12.84017 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.293351 0.136624 2.147133 0.0318 
M_B_RATIO -0.000654 0.013944 -0.046900 0.9626 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000772 0.002878 0.268156 0.7886 
     
     R-squared 0.013973     Mean dependent var 0.683172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013634     S.D. dependent var 71.05303 
S.E. of regression 70.56700     Akaike info criterion 11.35143 
Sum squared resid 57943814     Schwarz criterion 11.35459 
Log likelihood -66066.01     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.35249 
F-statistic 41.22256     Durbin-Watson stat 1.167304 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A29 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with dividend as 
dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1.391044 (6,11630) 0.2139 
Period Chi-square 8.351162 6 0.2135 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -11.77451 1.180030 -9.978141 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -5.016587 0.390695 -12.84017 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.293351 0.136624 2.147133 0.0318 
M_B_RATIO -0.000654 0.013944 -0.046900 0.9626 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000772 0.002878 0.268156 0.7886 
     
     R-squared 0.013973     Mean dependent var 0.683172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013634     S.D. dependent var 71.05303 
S.E. of regression 70.56700     Akaike info criterion 11.35143 
Sum squared resid 57943814     Schwarz criterion 11.35459 
Log likelihood -66066.01     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.35249 
F-statistic 41.22256     Durbin-Watson stat 1.167304 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
XVIII 
 
Table A30 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-section effects in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 4.937117 (1686,1649) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 6011.032632 1686 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.053766 0.003669 14.65593 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.013609 0.001278 10.64982 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.000863 0.000547 -1.576991 0.1149 
M_B_RATIO 0.000358 0.000109 3.279247 0.0011 
SALES_GROWTH -7.62E-06 9.52E-06 -0.800286 0.4236 
     
     R-squared 0.042193     Mean dependent var 0.024167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041044     S.D. dependent var 0.110322 
S.E. of regression 0.108034     Akaike info criterion -1.611246 
Sum squared resid 38.92390     Schwarz criterion -1.602094 
Log likelihood 2695.782     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.607972 
F-statistic 36.72812     Durbin-Watson stat 0.807572 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A31 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with dividend as 
dependant variable, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 8.052343 (1,3334) 0.0046 
Period Chi-square 8.057108 1 0.0045 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.053766 0.003669 14.65593 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.013609 0.001278 10.64982 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.000863 0.000547 -1.576991 0.1149 
M_B_RATIO 0.000358 0.000109 3.279247 0.0011 
SALES_GROWTH -7.62E-06 9.52E-06 -0.800286 0.4236 
     
     R-squared 0.042193     Mean dependent var 0.024167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.041044     S.D. dependent var 0.110322 
S.E. of regression 0.108034     Akaike info criterion -1.611246 
Sum squared resid 38.92390     Schwarz criterion -1.602094 
Log likelihood 2695.782     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.607972 
F-statistic 36.72812     Durbin-Watson stat 0.807572 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A32 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 2 with 
dividend as dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 7.778319 (1684,1654) 0.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 7315.248790 1684 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.010255 0.003030 3.384978 0.0007 
EXCESS_CASH -0.002735 0.001105 -2.474424 0.0134 
EBIT_RATIO 0.000115 0.000645 0.178332 0.8585 
M_B_RATIO 0.001224 6.96E-05 17.59514 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.007520 0.001371 -5.486020 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.101355     Mean dependent var 0.024677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.100278     S.D. dependent var 0.095989 
S.E. of regression 0.091049     Akaike info criterion -1.953347 
Sum squared resid 27.67166     Schwarz criterion -1.944201 
Log likelihood 3270.019     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.950075 
F-statistic 94.12063     Durbin-Watson stat 0.625063 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A33 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 2 with dividend as 
dependant variable, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 2.310889 (1,3337) 0.1286 
Period Chi-square 2.314243 1 0.1282 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.010255 0.003030 3.384978 0.0007 
EXCESS_CASH -0.002735 0.001105 -2.474424 0.0134 
EBIT_RATIO 0.000115 0.000645 0.178332 0.8585 
M_B_RATIO 0.001224 6.96E-05 17.59514 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.007520 0.001371 -5.486020 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.101355     Mean dependent var 0.024677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.100278     S.D. dependent var 0.095989 
S.E. of regression 0.091049     Akaike info criterion -1.953347 
Sum squared resid 27.67166     Schwarz criterion -1.944201 
Log likelihood 3270.019     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.950075 
F-statistic 94.12063     Durbin-Watson stat 0.625063 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.3.3 Step 3 Likelihood-ratio test 
Table A34 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 3, pre-
crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 0.979109 (1692,10101) 0.7116 
Cross-section Chi-square 1791.913180 1692 0.0449 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.139085 0.007240 19.20995 0.0000 
RD 1.23E-06 4.52E-06 0.273036 0.7848 
CAPEX -2.56E-06 1.71E-05 -0.150398 0.8805 
DIV -1.41E-06 1.47E-06 -0.961127 0.3365 
MB 0.001082 0.000363 2.981939 0.0029 
SIZE 0.981614 0.006672 147.1322 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.647888     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.647738     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.769235     Akaike info criterion 2.313669 
Sum squared resid 6978.188     Schwarz criterion 2.317419 
Log likelihood -13643.49     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.314928 
F-statistic 4339.832     Durbin-Watson stat 1.593994 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A35 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 3, pre-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 55.019753 (6,11786) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 325.938979 6 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.146546 0.008286 17.68538 0.0000 
RD 1.30E-06 4.52E-06 0.286778 0.7743 
CAPEX -2.61E-06 1.71E-05 -0.153097 0.8783 
DIV -1.43E-06 1.47E-06 -0.973957 0.3301 
MB 0.001078 0.000363 2.969933 0.0030 
SIZE 0.982640 0.006694 146.7944 0.0000 
BETA -0.006848 0.003700 -1.850751 0.0642 
     
     R-squared 0.647990     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.647811     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.769156     Akaike info criterion 2.313548 
Sum squared resid 6976.162     Schwarz criterion 2.317924 
Log likelihood -13641.77     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.315017 
F-statistic 3617.841     Durbin-Watson stat 1.594394 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A36 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 3, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 0.491498 (1689,1628) 1.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1369.250229 1689 1.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.070702 0.013593 5.201439 0.0000 
RD 1.30E-05 1.09E-05 1.197031 0.2314 
CAPEX -3.86E-05 0.000219 -0.176162 0.8602 
DIV -7.74E-06 5.67E-06 -1.365177 0.1723 
MB 0.213289 0.008305 25.68147 0.0000 
SIZE 2.908603 0.579916 5.015558 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.169012     Mean dependent var 0.097988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.167760     S.D. dependent var 0.854427 
S.E. of regression 0.779470     Akaike info criterion 2.341398 
Sum squared resid 2015.319     Schwarz criterion 2.352428 
Log likelihood -3884.233     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.345345 
F-statistic 134.9272     Durbin-Watson stat 2.788611 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A37 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 3, crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 1492.577068 (1,3315) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 1235.277417 1 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.024043 0.015316 1.569849 0.1165 
RD 1.37E-05 1.08E-05 1.271372 0.2037 
CAPEX 7.33E-06 0.000218 0.033635 0.9732 
DIV -7.31E-06 5.64E-06 -1.297370 0.1946 
MB 0.214233 0.008256 25.94936 0.0000 
SIZE 3.132992 0.577423 5.425815 0.0000 
BETA 0.045133 0.006979 6.467247 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.179363     Mean dependent var 0.097988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.177878     S.D. dependent var 0.854427 
S.E. of regression 0.774717     Akaike info criterion 2.329465 
Sum squared resid 1990.216     Schwarz criterion 2.342333 
Log likelihood -3863.407     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.334070 
F-statistic 120.7941     Durbin-Watson stat 2.821979 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A38 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for cross-sectional effects in the regression for step 3, post-
crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test cross-section fixed effects  
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Cross-section F 0.698870 (1688,1601) 1.0000 
Cross-section Chi-square 1819.076329 1688 0.0135 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.064711 0.007183 9.009020 0.0000 
RD 1.65E-07 1.64E-06 0.100273 0.9201 
CAPEX 6.57E-06 3.86E-06 1.703583 0.0886 
DIV -2.34E-06 1.76E-06 -1.330733 0.1834 
MB 0.000316 0.000151 2.095040 0.0362 
SIZE 4.581829 0.354737 12.91614 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.051686     Mean dependent var 0.089982 
Adjusted R-squared 0.050244     S.D. dependent var 0.402364 
S.E. of regression 0.392126     Akaike info criterion 0.967351 
Sum squared resid 505.7252     Schwarz criterion 0.978459 
Log likelihood -1587.711     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.971327 
F-statistic 35.85180     Durbin-Watson stat 2.368324 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A39 Likelihood-ratio test to probe the need for periodic effects in the regression for step 3, post-crisis. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests  
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 649.225293 (1,3287) 0.0000 
Period Chi-square 593.913607 1 0.0000 
     
          
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.064223 0.007984 8.043987 0.0000 
RD 1.72E-07 1.64E-06 0.104851 0.9165 
CAPEX 6.56E-06 3.86E-06 1.701485 0.0889 
DIV -2.34E-06 1.76E-06 -1.330468 0.1835 
MB 0.000316 0.000151 2.094184 0.0363 
SIZE 4.578969 0.355375 12.88490 0.0000 
BETA 0.000484 0.003452 0.140327 0.8884 
     
     R-squared 0.051691     Mean dependent var 0.089982 
Adjusted R-squared 0.049961     S.D. dependent var 0.402364 
S.E. of regression 0.392184     Akaike info criterion 0.967952 
Sum squared resid 505.7222     Schwarz criterion 0.980911 
Log likelihood -1587.701     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.972591 
F-statistic 29.87088     Durbin-Watson stat 2.368311 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
XXIII 
 
8.4 Hausman test 
8.4.1 Step 1 Hausman test 
Table A40 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 1. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 731.905049 8 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     CAPEX 0.231989 0.243723 0.000024 0.0157 
CASH_FLOW -0.041455 -0.059991 0.000008 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.063166 -0.181315 0.000128 0.0000 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000013 0.000150 0.000000 0.0000 
FIRM_SIZE 0.397024 0.212581 0.000094 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.345767 -0.378794 0.000031 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.002674 0.002987 0.000000 0.0000 
WC -0.093807 -0.102246 0.000001 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 1696   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 18136  
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -5.995707 0.181350 -33.06145 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.231989 0.017426 13.31254 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.041455 0.013456 -3.080841 0.0021 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS NA NA NA NA 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.063166 0.029516 -2.140041 0.0324 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 1.27E-05 0.000165 0.076862 0.9387 
FIRM_SIZE 0.397024 0.014108 28.14206 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.345767 0.012146 -28.46834 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.002674 0.000198 13.52908 0.0000 
WC -0.093807 0.005055 -18.55623 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.789931    Mean dependent var -1.158969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.768160    S.D. dependent var 1.726241 
S.E. of regression 0.831181    Akaike info criterion 2.557308 
Sum squared resid 11352.25    Schwarz criterion 3.290702 
Log likelihood -21485.67    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.798393 
F-statistic 36.28301    Durbin-Watson stat 1.187126 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A41 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the periodic dimension for the 
regression in step 1. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 131.098978 9 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     CAPEX 0.381414 0.373851 0.000001 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.231863 -0.228223 0.000002 0.0072 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS 1.431077 1.442983 0.000001 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.500813 -0.501624 0.000001 0.3057 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000622 0.000642 0.000000 0.0000 
FIRM_SIZE 0.079215 0.082824 0.000000 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.368775 -0.369943 0.000000 0.0265 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.005624 0.005644 0.000000 0.2429 
WC -0.190632 -0.191089 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 1696   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 18136  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.431763 0.077575 -31.34741 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.381414 0.019856 19.20916 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.231863 0.018309 -12.66409 0.0000 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS 1.431077 0.045313 31.58216 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.500813 0.024354 -20.56428 0.0000 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000622 0.000246 2.532981 0.0113 
FIRM_SIZE 0.079215 0.006004 13.19293 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.368775 0.009602 -38.40548 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.005624 0.000279 20.15618 0.0000 
WC -0.190632 0.006824 -27.93599 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.291403    Mean dependent var -1.158969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.290660    S.D. dependent var 1.726241 
S.E. of regression 1.453881    Akaike info criterion 3.587452 
Sum squared resid 38293.04    Schwarz criterion 3.596060 
Log likelihood -32511.01    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.590281 
F-statistic 392.1054    Durbin-Watson stat 0.400189 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.4.2 Step 2 Hausman test 
Table A42 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 429.402814 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH 0.039551 0.067218 0.000005 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.033832 -0.042065 0.000000 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000711 0.001149 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000106 -0.000088 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.344469 0.015304 22.50787 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.039551 0.005820 6.796270 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.033832 0.001586 -21.33511 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000711 0.000154 4.622501 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000106 2.65E-05 -3.995010 0.0001 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.776611     Mean dependent var 0.259119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738380     S.D. dependent var 1.165895 
S.E. of regression 0.596342     Akaike info criterion 1.938342 
Sum squared resid 3534.540     Schwarz criterion 3.014762 
Log likelihood -9580.117     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.299968 
F-statistic 20.31333     Durbin-Watson stat 1.492809 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A43 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the periodic dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 1.311021 4 0.8595 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH 0.146624 0.146295 0.000000 0.3104 
EBIT_RATIO -0.067370 -0.067391 0.000000 0.7650 
M_B_RATIO 0.002784 0.002779 0.000000 0.3694 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000091 0.000091 0.000000 0.9787 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.581703 0.017559 33.12817 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.146624 0.005817 25.20548 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.067370 0.002032 -33.14960 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.002784 0.000207 13.42624 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 9.14E-05 4.28E-05 2.134842 0.0328 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.191082     Mean dependent var 0.259119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.190386     S.D. dependent var 1.165895 
S.E. of regression 1.049055     Akaike info criterion 2.934601 
Sum squared resid 12799.01     Schwarz criterion 2.941558 
Log likelihood -17069.85     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.936938 
F-statistic 274.7228     Durbin-Watson stat 0.460619 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A44 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 241.841492 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.012438 0.020337 0.000078 0.0002 
EBIT_RATIO -0.034901 -0.051463 0.000003 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.014300 0.021053 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000100 -0.000072 0.000000 0.0582 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.123774 0.032374 3.823201 0.0001 
EXCESS_CASH -0.012438 0.013284 -0.936310 0.3493 
EBIT_RATIO -0.034901 0.003550 -9.831739 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.014300 0.000887 16.11344 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -9.98E-05 4.68E-05 -2.134543 0.0329 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.946929     Mean dependent var 0.243380 
Adjusted R-squared 0.892539     S.D. dependent var 1.118203 
S.E. of regression 0.366560     Akaike info criterion 1.137466 
Sum squared resid 221.5703     Schwarz criterion 4.232769 
Log likelihood -208.5680     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.244774 
F-statistic 17.40995     Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A45 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 348.055355 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.016249 0.033185 0.000108 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.110171 -0.104508 0.000039 0.3645 
M_B_RATIO -0.000638 0.006525 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.036913 -0.011601 0.000009 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.220297 0.033643 6.548166 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.016249 0.014533 -1.118076 0.2637 
EBIT_RATIO -0.110171 0.008268 -13.32513 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.000638 0.000762 -0.837293 0.4025 
SALES_GROWTH -0.036913 0.008575 -4.304827 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.923784     Mean dependent var 0.223458 
Adjusted R-squared 0.846001     S.D. dependent var 1.008903 
S.E. of regression 0.395920     Akaike info criterion 1.291590 
Sum squared resid 259.2693     Schwarz criterion 4.380911 
Log likelihood -469.8928     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.396708 
F-statistic 11.87647     Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XXIX 
 
Table A46 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 65.486926 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.016497 -0.010599 0.000002 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.005005 -0.004405 0.000000 0.0279 
M_B_RATIO 0.000310 0.000454 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000038 0.000037 0.000000 0.4426 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.339879 0.009574 35.49972 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.016497 0.003641 -4.531377 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.005005 0.000992 -5.045010 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000310 9.62E-05 3.219451 0.0013 
SALES_GROWTH 3.82E-05 1.66E-05 2.306971 0.0211 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.763201    Mean dependent var 0.385529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.722674    S.D. dependent var 0.708409 
S.E. of regression 0.373061    Akaike info criterion 1.000196 
Sum squared resid 1383.252    Schwarz criterion 2.076617 
Log likelihood -4119.639    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.361822 
F-statistic 18.83200    Durbin-Watson stat 1.612263 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A47 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the periodic dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 22.354747 4 0.0002 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH 0.017228 0.016307 0.000000 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.004004 0.003915 0.000000 0.0595 
M_B_RATIO 0.001625 0.001614 0.000000 0.0051 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000034 0.000035 0.000000 0.0371 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.411070 0.011768 34.93226 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.017228 0.003898 4.419128 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.004004 0.001362 2.939492 0.0033 
M_B_RATIO 0.001625 0.000139 11.69423 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 3.36E-05 2.87E-05 1.172309 0.2411 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.015931    Mean dependent var 0.385529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015085    S.D. dependent var 0.708409 
S.E. of regression 0.703045    Akaike info criterion 2.134154 
Sum squared resid 5748.393    Schwarz criterion 2.141111 
Log likelihood -12410.84    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.136491 
F-statistic 18.82729    Durbin-Watson stat 0.398686 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A48 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 52.492203 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.056760 -0.008209 0.000083 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.000898 -0.001370 0.000003 0.7903 
M_B_RATIO -0.003114 -0.000534 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000029 -0.000014 0.000000 0.0098 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.257777 0.030063 8.574643 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.056760 0.012335 -4.601545 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.000898 0.003296 -0.272501 0.7853 
M_B_RATIO -0.003114 0.000824 -3.778918 0.0002 
SALES_GROWTH 2.88E-05 4.34E-05 0.662501 0.5077 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.882080    Mean dependent var 0.371824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.761227    S.D. dependent var 0.696592 
S.E. of regression 0.340385    Akaike info criterion 0.989295 
Sum squared resid 191.0566    Schwarz criterion 4.084598 
Log likelihood 38.87662    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.096604 
F-statistic 7.298818    Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A49 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 24.538346 4 0.0001 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.014226 -0.011011 0.000031 0.5655 
EBIT_RATIO 0.005437 0.013128 0.000012 0.0253 
M_B_RATIO -0.000717 0.000655 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.027753 0.028210 0.000002 0.7621 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.314410 0.020881 15.05743 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.014226 0.009020 -1.577150 0.1150 
EBIT_RATIO 0.005437 0.005132 1.059426 0.2896 
M_B_RATIO -0.000717 0.000473 -1.514838 0.1300 
SALES_GROWTH 0.027753 0.005322 5.214718 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.933045     Mean dependent var 0.345916 
Adjusted R-squared 0.864713     S.D. dependent var 0.668091 
S.E. of regression 0.245733     Akaike info criterion 0.337658 
Sum squared resid 99.87653     Schwarz criterion 3.426978 
Log likelihood 1124.605     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.442776 
F-statistic 13.65464     Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A50 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 202.501354 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -13.147366 -5.515925 0.287807 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.988510 0.326156 0.014569 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.053443 -0.002766 0.000118 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.002124 0.000910 0.000001 0.2760 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -31.35548 1.767795 -17.73706 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -13.14737 0.672211 -19.55839 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.988510 0.183170 5.396695 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.053443 0.017771 -3.007384 0.0026 
SALES_GROWTH 0.002124 0.003059 0.694388 0.4875 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.197495     Mean dependent var 0.683172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.060151     S.D. dependent var 71.05303 
S.E. of regression 68.88293     Akaike info criterion 11.43704 
Sum squared resid 47159147     Schwarz criterion 12.51346 
Log likelihood -64867.30     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.79867 
F-statistic 1.437959     Durbin-Watson stat 1.416708 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A51 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the periodic dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 7.554637 4 0.1093 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -5.059280 -5.016587 0.000476 0.0504 
EBIT_RATIO 0.293134 0.293351 0.000022 0.9636 
M_B_RATIO -0.001004 -0.000654 0.000000 0.3916 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000676 0.000772 0.000000 0.1248 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -11.87669 1.181037 -10.05615 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -5.059280 0.391264 -12.93060 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.293134 0.136693 2.144480 0.0320 
M_B_RATIO -0.001004 0.013948 -0.071965 0.9426 
SALES_GROWTH 0.000676 0.002879 0.234837 0.8143 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.014680     Mean dependent var 0.683172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.013833     S.D. dependent var 71.05303 
S.E. of regression 70.55989     Akaike info criterion 11.35175 
Sum squared resid 57902260     Schwarz criterion 11.35870 
Log likelihood -66061.83     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.35408 
F-statistic 17.32697     Durbin-Watson stat 1.167888 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A52 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 249.769304 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH 0.004193 0.010180 0.000003 0.0011 
EBIT_RATIO -0.001987 -0.001847 0.000000 0.7106 
M_B_RATIO -0.000648 0.000068 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000132 -0.000089 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.038421 0.005518 6.963280 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.004193 0.002264 1.851896 0.0642 
EBIT_RATIO -0.001987 0.000605 -3.283955 0.0010 
M_B_RATIO -0.000648 0.000151 -4.282346 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000132 7.97E-06 -16.53112 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.841630     Mean dependent var 0.024167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679322     S.D. dependent var 0.110322 
S.E. of regression 0.062473     Akaike info criterion -2.401376 
Sum squared resid 6.435942     Schwarz criterion 0.693927 
Log likelihood 5701.298     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.294067 
F-statistic 5.185389     Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A53 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 425.482585 4 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     EXCESS_CASH -0.015721 -0.007371 0.000001 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.011326 0.003615 0.000000 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000464 0.000730 0.000000 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.016367 -0.013850 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.013212 0.003680 -3.590052 0.0003 
EXCESS_CASH -0.015721 0.001590 -9.888762 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.011326 0.000904 12.52341 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000464 8.34E-05 5.566782 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.016367 0.000938 -17.44858 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.899248     Mean dependent var 0.024677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796426     S.D. dependent var 0.095989 
S.E. of regression 0.043309     Akaike info criterion -3.134097 
Sum squared resid 3.102412     Schwarz criterion -0.044776 
Log likelihood 6927.644     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.028979 
F-statistic 8.745615     Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
XXXVII 
 
8.4.3 Step 3 Hausman test 
Table A54 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 3, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 58.203240 5 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero. 
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     RD -0.000004 0.000001 0.000000 0.0051 
CAPEX 0.000002 -0.000003 0.000000 0.4907 
DIV -0.000001 -0.000001 0.000000 0.4470 
MB 0.000299 0.001078 0.000000 0.0000 
SIZE 0.969757 0.982640 0.000006 0.0000 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1693  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11799 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.142005 0.007274 19.52164 0.0000 
RD -4.01E-06 4.90E-06 -0.818701 0.4130 
CAPEX 2.19E-06 1.84E-05 0.118720 0.9055 
DIV -9.80E-07 1.59E-06 -0.617882 0.5367 
MB 0.000299 0.000393 0.760403 0.4470 
SIZE 0.969757 0.007159 135.4506 0.0000 
BETA NA NA NA NA 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.697500     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.646679     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.770391     Akaike info criterion 2.448603 
Sum squared resid 5994.962     Schwarz criterion 3.510053 
Log likelihood -12747.53     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.804962 
F-statistic 13.72468     Durbin-Watson stat 1.857869 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A54 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the period dimension for the 
regression in step 3, pre-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test period random effects   
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Period random 330.118507 6 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated period random effects variance is zero. 
     
Period random effects test comparisons:  
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     RD 0.000002 0.000001 0.000000 0.0005 
CAPEX -0.000001 -0.000003 0.000000 0.0001 
DIV -0.000001 -0.000001 0.000000 0.0000 
MB 0.001096 0.001078 0.000000 0.1595 
SIZE 1.005805 0.982640 0.000004 0.0000 
BETA -0.007943 -0.006848 0.000000 0.0000 
     
          
Period random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1693  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11799 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.142971 0.008181 17.47603 0.0000 
RD 1.68E-06 4.46E-06 0.377940 0.7055 
CAPEX -1.19E-06 1.68E-05 -0.070937 0.9434 
DIV -8.32E-07 1.45E-06 -0.573818 0.5661 
MB 0.001096 0.000358 3.058773 0.0022 
SIZE 1.005805 0.006922 145.3081 0.0000 
BETA -0.007943 0.003651 -2.175396 0.0296 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.657581     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.657232     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.758799     Akaike info criterion 2.286940 
Sum squared resid 6786.088     Schwarz criterion 2.295067 
Log likelihood -13478.81     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.289669 
F-statistic 1886.151     Durbin-Watson stat 1.590696 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A55 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 3, crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 124.563359 5 0.0000 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero. 
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     RD 0.000021 0.000014 0.000000 0.5802 
CAPEX -0.000212 0.000007 0.000000 0.3882 
DIV -0.000010 -0.000007 0.000000 0.6935 
MB 0.311407 0.214233 0.000077 0.0000 
SIZE 4.116540 3.132992 0.436083 0.1364 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1690  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3323 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.058046 0.015859 3.660064 0.0003 
RD 2.07E-05 1.79E-05 1.160402 0.2461 
CAPEX -0.000212 0.000360 -0.589311 0.5557 
DIV -9.92E-06 9.33E-06 -1.062892 0.2880 
MB 0.311407 0.013059 23.84552 0.0000 
SIZE 4.116540 0.944210 4.359772 0.0000 
BETA NA NA NA NA 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.449646     Mean dependent var 0.097988 
Adjusted R-squared -0.123021     S.D. dependent var 0.854427 
S.E. of regression 0.905459     Akaike info criterion 2.945897 
Sum squared resid 1334.725     Schwarz criterion 6.061791 
Log likelihood -3199.608     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.060861 
F-statistic 0.785179     Durbin-Watson stat 4.067319 
Prob(F-statistic) 1.000000    
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Table A55 Hausman test to examine whether random effects are needed in the cross-sectional dimension for the 
regression in step 3, post-crisis. 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 9.136578 5 0.1037 
     
     ** WARNING: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero. 
     
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
     
Variable Fixed   Random  Var(Diff.)  Prob.  
     
     RD -0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.5644 
CAPEX 0.000008 0.000007 0.000000 0.7159 
DIV -0.000004 -0.000002 0.000000 0.4044 
MB 0.000273 0.000316 0.000000 0.7927 
SIZE 3.385956 4.578969 0.171390 0.0040 
     
          
Cross-section random effects test equation: 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1689  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3295 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.072335 0.008224 8.795595 0.0000 
RD -8.54E-07 2.52E-06 -0.338601 0.7350 
CAPEX 8.09E-06 5.93E-06 1.363913 0.1728 
DIV -3.92E-06 2.69E-06 -1.455477 0.1457 
MB 0.000273 0.000232 1.176245 0.2397 
SIZE 3.385956 0.566324 5.978831 0.0000 
BETA NA NA NA NA 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.454003     Mean dependent var 0.089982 
Adjusted R-squared -0.123370     S.D. dependent var 0.402364 
S.E. of regression 0.426462     Akaike info criterion 1.439862 
Sum squared resid 291.1742     Schwarz criterion 4.576030 
Log likelihood -678.1725     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.562564 
F-statistic 0.786325     Durbin-Watson stat 4.100809 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.999999    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
XLI 
 
8.5 Multicollinearity test 
8.5.1 Step 1 Multicollinearity test 
Table A56 Correlation matrix for the explaining variables in the regression for step 1 to check for potential 
multicollinearity. 
 
8.5.2 Step 2 Multicollinearity test 
Table A57 Correlation matrix for the explaining variables in the regression for step 2 to check for potential 
multicollinearity. 
 
8.5.3 Step 3 Multicollinearity test 
Table A58 Correlation matrix for the explaining variables in the regression for step 3 to check for potential 
multicollinearity. 
 
Variables CAPEX CF CFR DIV-D FD SIZE LEVERAGE MB WC
Step 1
CAPEX
CF
CFR
DIV-D
FD
1
-0.0319
SIZE
LEVERAGE
MB
WC
1
0.2371
0.3985
0.0244
0.0185
-0.0587
0.4249
0.1317
-0.2569
1
0.0851
0.1640
-0.0701
0.2001
0.1958
-0.2781
-0.4539 1
1
0.0436
-0.1631
0.0873
1
-0.0463
-0.1689
1
1
-0.074
0.0387
1
0.4404
0.1196
-0.1119
-0.0535
-0.0138
0.1147
-0.12
0.0631 -0.12780.1968
0.2622
0.1393
-0.2271
Variables XC EBIT MB Growth
1
Step 2
XC
EBIT
MB
Growth
0.1618
-0.0669
0.0157
-0.5185
-0.0260 0.0179
1
1
1
Variables BETA CAPEX DIV MB R&D SIZE
-0.0009
-0.0069
Step 3
0.0118
-0.0022
0.0057 0.0014
1
BETA
CAPEX
DIV
MB
R&D
SIZE
-0.0050
-0.0440
0.0007
0.0337 0.0011
1
1
1
1
1-0.0330
0.0574
0.0485
0.0009
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8.6 Normality test 
8.6.1 Step 1 Normality test 
Table A59 Normality test for the regression in step 1. 
 
8.6.2 Step 2 Normality test 
Table A60 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Table A61 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2001 2011 IF CAPEX<6.4523985240 AND CASH_FLOW>-273.2
     AND FINANCIAL_DISTRESS<4006 AND LEVERAGE<8.1783925830 AND
     MARKET_TO_BOOK<7490488 AND WC>-6800 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND FIRM_SIZE>5.680172
     AND CASHFLOW_RISKINESS<1.7768
Observ ations 18136
Mean      -2.32e-16
Median   0.157578
Maximum  5.074840
Minimum -16.19487
Std. Dev .   1.453119
Skewness  -0.695957
Kurtosis   5.091543
Jarque-Bera  4769.748
Probability  0.000000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2001 2007 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 11641
Mean       3.39e-18
Median  -0.002249
Maximum  12.29342
Minimum -7.894336
Std. Dev.   0.550982
Skewness   3.958487
Kurtosis   120.7949
Jarque-Bera  6760663.
Probability  0.000000
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2008 2009 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3340
Mean       1.41e-18
Median   0.000000
Maximum  4.386658
Minimum -4.386658
Std. Dev.   0.256935
Skewness  -4.62e-16
Kurtosis   138.9350
Jarque-Bera  2571566.
Probability  0.000000
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Table A62 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with R&D as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
Table A63 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Table A64 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2010 2011 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3343
Mean       1.19e-18
Median   0.000000
Maximum  4.957907
Minimum -4.957907
Std. Dev.   0.278519
Skewness   5.92e-16
Kurtosis   148.1744
Jarque-Bera  2935656.
Probability  0.000000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2001 2007 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 11641
Mean       1.51e-18
Median  -0.002498
Maximum  4.655705
Minimum -2.880316
Std. Dev.   0.343217
Skewness   2.787463
Kurtosis   39.96429
Jarque-Bera  677816.0
Probability  0.000000
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2008 2009 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3340
Mean      -3.29e-18
Median   0.000000
Maximum  2.768556
Minimum -2.768556
Std. Dev.   0.236839
Skewness  -3.70e-16
Kurtosis   45.14963
Jarque-Bera  247242.2
Probability  0.000000
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Table A65 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with CAPEX as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
Table A66 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, pre-crisis. 
 
Table A67 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
-2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2010 2011 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3343
Mean      -6.73e-19
Median   0.000000
Maximum  2.331770
Minimum -2.331770
Std. Dev.   0.171750
Skewness  -2.18e-16
Kurtosis   55.98068
Jarque-Bera  390985.1
Probability  0.000000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
-1000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2001 2007 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 11641
Mean       2.39e-16
Median   0.202501
Maximum  6141.656
Minimum -1239.916
Std. Dev.   63.60105
Skewness   74.22073
Kurtosis   7530.938
Jarque-Bera  2.75e+10
Probability  0.000000
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2008 2009 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3340
Mean       1.11e-19
Median   0.000000
Maximum  1.335267
Minimum -1.335267
Std. Dev.   0.043863
Skewness  -3.61e-18
Kurtosis   603.4150
Jarque-Bera  50169328
Probability  0.000000
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Table A68 Normality test for the regression in step 2 with dividend as the dependant variable, post-crisis. 
 
8.6.3 Step 3 Normality test: 
Table A69 Normality test for the regression in step 3, pre-crisis. 
 
Table A70 Normality test for the regression in step 3, crisis. 
 
0
400
800
1,200
1,600
2,000
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2010 2011 IF CAPEX_RATIO<6.5296116660 AND DIV_RATIO
     <181392 AND EBIT_RATIO>-1371 AND M_B_RATIO<7490488 AND
     R_D_RATIO<16.3752422200 AND SALES_GROWTH<44874 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS<5.1855611490 AND
     LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS>-7.5834869810 AND EXCESS_CASH>
     -95807.4267944450
Observations 3343
Mean      -2.03e-19
Median   0.000000
Maximum  0.818095
Minimum -0.818095
Std. Dev.   0.030461
Skewness   6.34e-16
Kurtosis   364.1866
Jarque-Bera  18171397
Probability  0.000000
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2001 2007 IF RD<57924.89855235463 AND CAPEX
     <47452.831778574044 AND DIV<139502.7542662116 AND
     BETA>-39.31220583679209 AND BETA
     <29.99673862223946 AND MB<1097974.279694854 AND
     SIZE<1427.6067708333333 AND MV<127.8918918918919
Observations 11799
Mean      -6.15e-17
Median  -0.004479
Maximum  45.88165
Minimum -1.243499
Std. Dev.   0.758413
Skewness   24.64518
Kurtosis   1240.482
Jarque-Bera  7.54e+08
Probability  0.000000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2008 2009 IF RD<49458.3590929876 AND CAPEX
     <1453733.259693432 AND DIV<132890.2424198322 AND
     BETA>-39.3122058368 AND BETA<29.9967386222 AND MB>
     -27.0390033839 AND MB<29.2323844631 AND SIZE>
     -0.1254108823 AND SIZE<0.133850205 AND MV
     <5.9254327945
Observations 3323
Mean       8.79e-18
Median  -0.100759
Maximum  5.432548
Minimum -2.660063
Std. Dev.   0.642731
Skewness   2.894120
Kurtosis   17.34043
Jarque-Bera  33112.55
Probability  0.000000
XLVI 
 
Table A71 Normality test for the regression in step 3, post-crisis. 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 2010 2011 IF RD<1040918.00067176 AND CAPEX
     <101735.9898464268 AND DIV<103453.8071165854 AND
     BETA>-39.3122058368 AND BETA<29.9967386222 AND MB
     >-2597.3601877753 AND SIZE>-0.0822651478 AND SIZE
     <0.0933064602 AND MV<2.1574329134
Observations 3295
Mean       8.93e-18
Median  -0.041035
Maximum  1.964402
Minimum -1.137770
Std. Dev.   0.358059
Skewness   1.256685
Kurtosis   6.627223
Jarque-Bera  2673.587
Probability  0.000000
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8.7 Tables 
8.7.1 Step 1 Tables 
Table A72 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the pre-crisis period.  
 
Table A73 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the crisis period. 
 
EXCESS_CASH FIRM_SIZE WC MARKET_TO_BOOK LEVERAGE FINANCIAL_DISTRESS DIVIDENDS CASHFLOW_RISKINESS CASH_FLOW CAPEX
 Mean -2.534805 12.61921 -0.176818 11.82866 0.913149 1.497416 0.418425 0.45082 0.159311 0.370134
 Median -2.410998 12.67326 0.201437 3.51357 0.474531 4.46E-05 0 0.3737 0.170152 0.136523
 Maximum 3.073199 18.83292 0.96668 2368.913 8.167928 2744 1 1.073726 8.409525 6.452399
 Minimum -18.66685 5.693732 -96.33333 -53.44501 1.42E-08 2.64E-09 0 0.054441 -20.44194 2.00E-07
 Std, Dev, 1.560966 2.054172 1.992818 52.40143 1.271586 41.97045 0.493322 0.266024 0.695036 0.673854
 Skewness -0.531009 -0.077083 -17.1735 18.89857 2.50536 44.79267 0.330732 0.642526 -7.476456 4.129762
 Kurtosis 4.844992 2.865378 578.0719 553.4847 10.16362 2348.383 1.109383 2.187166 159.4238 24.48305
 Jarque-Bera 2174.734 20.10193 1.59E+08 1.46E+08 36674.31 2.64E+09 1925.242 1109.498 11849066 254209.6
 Probability 0 0.000043 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Sum -29193.35 145335.5 -2036.415 136230.7 10516.74 17245.74 4819 5192.098 1834.79 4262.838
 Sum Sq, Dev, 28060.04 48593.16 45733.76 31621894 18620.57 20285653 2802.61 814.9759 5563.085 5229.174
 Observations 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517 11517
Pre-crisis
EXCESS_CASH FIRM_SIZE WC MARKET_TO_BOOK LEVERAGE FINANCIAL_DISTRESS DIVIDENDS CASHFLOW_RISKINESS CASH_FLOW CAPEX
 Mean -2.259277 12.92025 -0.137169 6.954343 0.920419 0.85304 0.711562 0.451535 0.078189 0.350526
 Median -2.136265 12.96466 0.207705 2.428491 0.475144 0.0000345 1 0.3737 0.143237 0.117722
 Maximum 3.174419 18.61216 0.937733 825.9887 8.01399 1536.167 1 1.073726 3.997015 6.385214
 Minimum -8.011998 6.251904 -32.75767 -79.81185 2.31E-08 2.45E-09 0 0.054441 -17.22264 2.01E-07
 Std. Dev. 1.425697 2.033497 1.670513 25.99336 1.303197 27.86747 0.453105 0.267231 0.732427 0.653183
 Skewness -0.508895 -0.035567 -9.414457 15.63794 2.532273 51.52727 -0.933973 0.645154 -8.511253 4.316537
 Kurtosis 3.658007 2.779523 133.1072 371.8173 10.18659 2801.204 1.872306 2.191458 144.4047 26.90064
 Jarque-Bera 202.2143 7.388563 2379210 18860938 10641.17 1080000000 655.4197 319.199 2792577 88901.05
 Probability 0 0.024865 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Sum -7464.651 42688.49 -453.2074 22977.15 3041.065 2818.445 2351 1491.873 258.3358 1158.137
 Sum Sq. Dev. 6713.713 13658.27 9217.4 2231688 5609.555 2565096 678.1183 235.8744 1771.893 1409.219
 Observations 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304 3304
Crisis
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Table A74 Descriptive statistics of the variables in the post-crisis period. 
 
 
EXCESS_CASH FIRM_SIZE WC MARKET_TO_BOOK LEVERAGE FINANCIAL_DISTRESS DIVIDENDS CASHFLOW_RISKINESS CASH_FLOW CAPEX
 Mean -2.218522 13.02968 -0.128627 8.628751 0.890464 2.13792 0.512372 0.452364 0.184351 0.336878
 Median -2.097972 13.0736 0.220415 3.10648 0.417792 4.12E-05 1 0.3737 0.168662 0.112626
 Maximum 1.487118 18.77353 0.969072 832.5288 8.163111 2904 1 1.073726 4.453739 6.394033
 Minimum -8.608355 6.507278 -40.92404 -19.22008 2.22E-08 2.24E-09 0 0.054441 -8.696742 6.46E-07
 Std. Dev. 1.336091 2.062444 1.665739 32.81504 1.318229 62.74555 0.499922 0.267305 0.466893 0.65421
 Skewness -0.641125 -0.026256 -10.85766 13.76263 2.631865 38.40947 -0.049502 0.638389 -3.493166 4.554248
 Kurtosis 4.042841 2.708264 188.077 252.1855 10.90536 1599.425 1.00245 2.179503 63.70816 28.96129
 Jarque-Bera 377.1999 12.13298 4794952 8678680 12455.33 3.53E+08 552.3342 318.0583 515643.1 104522.6
 Probability 0 0.002319 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Sum -7352.181 43180.36 -426.269 28595.68 2950.999 7085.068 1698 1499.134 610.9379 1116.413
 Sum Sq. Dev. 5914.163 14092.43 9192.533 3567528 5757.096 13043296 827.9928 236.7204 722.1992 1417.934
 Observations 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314 3314
Post-crisis
XLIX 
 
8.8 Regressions (with OLS standard errors) 
Table A75 Regression results for the homoscedastic sample in the step 3 regression, pre-crisis, with OLS 
standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1693  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11799 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.142971 0.008181 17.47603 0.0000 
RD 1.68E-06 4.46E-06 0.377940 0.7055 
CAPEX -1.19E-06 1.68E-05 -0.070937 0.9434 
DIV -8.32E-07 1.45E-06 -0.573818 0.5661 
MB 0.001096 0.000358 3.058773 0.0022 
SIZE 1.005805 0.006922 145.3081 0.0000 
BETA -0.007943 0.003651 -2.175396 0.0296 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.657581     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.657232     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.758799     Akaike info criterion 2.286940 
Sum squared resid 6786.088     Schwarz criterion 2.295067 
Log likelihood -13478.81     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.289669 
F-statistic 1886.151     Durbin-Watson stat 1.590696 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table A76 Regression results for the homoscedastic sample in the step 3 regression, post-crisis, with OLS 
standard errors. 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1689  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3295 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.063247 0.007297 8.667395 0.0000 
RD 9.47E-07 1.50E-06 0.630748 0.5282 
CAPEX 4.84E-06 3.53E-06 1.372807 0.1699 
DIV -1.57E-06 1.61E-06 -0.980631 0.3268 
MB 0.000244 0.000138 1.765727 0.0775 
SIZE 4.572419 0.324797 14.07776 0.0000 
BETA 0.001011 0.003155 0.320534 0.7486 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.208102     Mean dependent var 0.089982 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206415     S.D. dependent var 0.402364 
S.E. of regression 0.358440     Akaike info criterion 0.788312 
Sum squared resid 422.3104     Schwarz criterion 0.803123 
Log likelihood -1290.744     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.793614 
F-statistic 123.3978     Durbin-Watson stat 2.069001 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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8.9 Detailed regressions used for analysis 
Table A77 Regression for step 1 with liquid asset holdings as the dependent variable, with periodical fixed effects 
and robust standard errors (white cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: LIQUID_ASSET_HOLDINGS  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 15:26   
Periods included: 11   
Cross-sections included: 1696   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 18136  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -2.431763 0.086421 -28.13862 0.0000 
CAPEX 0.381414 0.041788 9.127256 0.0000 
CASH_FLOW -0.231863 0.035438 -6.542800 0.0000 
CASHFLOW_RISKINESS 1.431077 0.045449 31.48774 0.0000 
DIVIDEND_DUMMY -0.500813 0.039314 -12.73884 0.0000 
FINANCIAL_DISTRESS 0.000622 0.000336 1.849780 0.0644 
FIRM_SIZE 0.079215 0.006846 11.57141 0.0000 
LEVERAGE -0.368775 0.009211 -40.03524 0.0000 
MARKET_TO_BOOK 0.005624 0.001168 4.816899 0.0000 
WC -0.190632 0.037276 -5.114119 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.291403    Mean dependent var -1.158969 
Adjusted R-squared 0.290660    S.D. dependent var 1.726241 
S.E. of regression 1.453881    Akaike info criterion 3.587452 
Sum squared resid 38293.04    Schwarz criterion 3.596060 
Log likelihood -32511.01    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.590281 
F-statistic 392.1054    Durbin-Watson stat 0.400189 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A78 Pre-crisis regression for step 2 with R&D-ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section) 
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.342594 0.036103 9.489482 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.038772 0.012855 3.016127 0.0026 
EBIT_RATIO -0.033830 0.006835 -4.949555 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000705 0.000672 1.049492 0.2940 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000106 6.06E-05 -1.740513 0.0818 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.776666     Mean dependent var 0.259119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.738285     S.D. dependent var 1.165895 
S.E. of regression 0.596449     Akaike info criterion 1.939129 
Sum squared resid 3533.680     Schwarz criterion 3.019345 
Log likelihood -9578.700     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.302030 
F-statistic 20.23605     Durbin-Watson stat 1.493114 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table A79 Crisis Regression for step 2 with R&D-ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). 
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.152791 7.16E-14 2.13E+12 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.001000 2.83E-14 3.53E+10 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.034811 1.09E-15 -3.19E+13 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.014703 8.71E-16 1.69E+13 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000105 2.07E-17 -5.08E+12 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.947204     Mean dependent var 0.243380 
Adjusted R-squared 0.893030     S.D. dependent var 1.118203 
S.E. of regression 0.365723     Akaike info criterion 1.132884 
Sum squared resid 220.4255     Schwarz criterion 4.230018 
Log likelihood -199.9170     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.240848 
F-statistic 17.48447     Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A80 Post-crisis regression for step 2 with R&D-ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (white cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: R_D_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.221056 9.06E-14 2.44E+12 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.015834 4.41E-14 -3.59E+11 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.110121 3.35E-15 -3.29E+13 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.000620 7.66E-16 -8.10E+11 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.036845 1.80E-15 -2.05E+13 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.923790     Mean dependent var 0.223458 
Adjusted R-squared 0.845921     S.D. dependent var 1.008903 
S.E. of regression 0.396024     Akaike info criterion 1.292108 
Sum squared resid 259.2484     Schwarz criterion 4.383258 
Log likelihood -469.7584     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.397880 
F-statistic 11.86329     Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table A81 Pre-crisis regression for step 2 with CAPEX -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.347133 0.017797 19.50482 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.013472 0.007291 -1.847771 0.0647 
EBIT_RATIO -0.005067 0.001795 -2.822213 0.0048 
M_B_RATIO 0.000336 0.000323 1.041998 0.2974 
SALES_GROWTH 3.63E-05 2.94E-05 1.235525 0.2167 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.765269    Mean dependent var 0.385529 
Adjusted R-squared 0.724930    S.D. dependent var 0.708409 
S.E. of regression 0.371540    Akaike info criterion 0.992455 
Sum squared resid 1371.171    Schwarz criterion 2.072670 
Log likelihood -4068.582    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.355356 
F-statistic 18.97099    Durbin-Watson stat 1.615356 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A82 Crisis regression for step 2 with CAPEX -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.310382 4.26E-13 7.29E+11 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.032398 1.80E-13 -1.80E+11 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.000734 5.41E-15 -1.35E+11 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.002384 7.23E-16 -3.30E+12 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 1.90E-05 1.15E-16 1.65E+11 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.884402    Mean dependent var 0.371824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.765788    S.D. dependent var 0.696592 
S.E. of regression 0.337119    Akaike info criterion 0.970003 
Sum squared resid 187.2938    Schwarz criterion 4.067136 
Log likelihood 72.09494    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.077966 
F-statistic 7.456118    Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     Table A83 Post-crisis regression for step 2 with CAPEX -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: CAPEX_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343  
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.320385 2.78E-13 1.15E+12 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.010952 1.28E-13 -8.57E+10 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.005829 2.41E-15 2.42E+12 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.000577 5.95E-16 -9.70E+11 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH 0.028295 2.25E-16 1.26E+14 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.933912    Mean dependent var 0.345916 
Adjusted R-squared 0.866384    S.D. dependent var 0.668091 
S.E. of regression 0.244210    Akaike info criterion 0.325218 
Sum squared resid 98.58286    Schwarz criterion 3.416368 
Log likelihood 1146.397    Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.430991 
F-statistic 13.83011    Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A84 Pre-crisis regression for step 2 with Dividend -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1698  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11641 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -31.90684 27.74000 -1.150210 0.2501 
EXCESS_CASH -13.37807 11.39356 -1.174178 0.2404 
EBIT_RATIO 0.989920 0.704115 1.405907 0.1598 
M_B_RATIO -0.055574 0.053312 -1.042443 0.2972 
SALES_GROWTH 0.002070 0.003432 0.603059 0.5465 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.198759     Mean dependent var 0.683172 
Adjusted R-squared 0.061064     S.D. dependent var 71.05303 
S.E. of regression 68.84946     Akaike info criterion 11.43650 
Sum squared resid 47084888     Schwarz criterion 12.51671 
Log likelihood -64858.13     Hannan-Quinn criter. 11.79940 
F-statistic 1.443475     Durbin-Watson stat 1.418412 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
Table A85 Crisis regression for step 2 with dividend -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and cross-
sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1687  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3340 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.041379 6.83E-14 6.06E+11 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH 0.005563 2.89E-14 1.92E+11 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO -0.001978 8.69E-16 -2.28E+12 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO -0.000607 1.20E-16 -5.06E+12 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.000132 1.85E-17 -7.15E+12 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.841923     Mean dependent var 0.024167 
Adjusted R-squared 0.679720     S.D. dependent var 0.110322 
S.E. of regression 0.062435     Akaike info criterion -2.402628 
Sum squared resid 6.424043     Schwarz criterion 0.694505 
Log likelihood 5704.388     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.294664 
F-statistic 5.190578     Durbin-Watson stat 4.038694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
LV 
 
Table A86 Post-crisis regression for step 2 with dividend -ratio as the dependent variable, with periodical and 
cross-sectional fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: DIV_RATIO  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1685  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3343 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.013011 2.91E-14 -4.47E+11 0.0000 
EXCESS_CASH -0.015611 1.29E-14 -1.21E+12 0.0000 
EBIT_RATIO 0.011340 1.03E-15 1.10E+13 0.0000 
M_B_RATIO 0.000469 5.35E-17 8.77E+12 0.0000 
SALES_GROWTH -0.016349 3.37E-16 -4.85E+13 0.0000 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.899296     Mean dependent var 0.024677 
Adjusted R-squared 0.796398     S.D. dependent var 0.095989 
S.E. of regression 0.043312     Akaike info criterion -3.133971 
Sum squared resid 3.100949     Schwarz criterion -0.042821 
Log likelihood 6928.432     Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.028198 
F-statistic 8.739737     Durbin-Watson stat 4.030139 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table A87 Pre-crisis regression for step 3 with market values as the dependant variable, with periodic fixed 
effects and robuststandard errors (White cross-section). 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 7   
Cross-sections included: 1693  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 11799 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.142971 0.019512 7.327203 0.0000 
RD 1.68E-06 4.58E-06 0.367853 0.7130 
CAPEX -1.19E-06 1.74E-06 -0.686899 0.4922 
DIV -8.32E-07 4.08E-07 -2.038803 0.0415 
MB 0.001096 0.000555 1.976247 0.0482 
SIZE 1.005805 0.004717 213.2510 0.0000 
BETA -0.007943 0.017726 -0.448102 0.6541 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.657581     Mean dependent var 0.330064 
Adjusted R-squared 0.657232     S.D. dependent var 1.296064 
S.E. of regression 0.758799     Akaike info criterion 2.286940 
Sum squared resid 6786.088     Schwarz criterion 2.295067 
Log likelihood -13478.81     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.289669 
F-statistic 1886.151     Durbin-Watson stat 1.590696 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A88 Crisis regression for step 3 with change in market value as the dependent variable, with periodical  
fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1690  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3323 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.030954 0.070572 0.438609 0.6610 
RD -1.04E-06 4.50E-07 -2.320275 0.0204 
CAPEX -9.59E-05 5.99E-05 -1.601196 0.1094 
DIV -1.54E-06 6.36E-07 -2.412479 0.0159 
MB 0.125327 0.015792 7.936261 0.0000 
SIZE 3.439391 0.563885 6.099452 0.0000 
BETA 0.050674 0.070674 0.717013 0.4734 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.434141     Mean dependent var 0.097988 
Adjusted R-squared 0.432946     S.D. dependent var 0.854427 
S.E. of regression 0.643409     Akaike info criterion 1.958332 
Sum squared resid 1372.327     Schwarz criterion 1.973038 
Log likelihood -3245.768     Hannan-Quinn criter. 1.963594 
F-statistic 363.3356     Durbin-Watson stat 2.478507 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
 
Table A89 Post-crisis regression for step 3 with change in market value as the dependent variable, with periodical  
fixed effects and robust standard errors (White cross-section). 
 
Dependent Variable: MV   
Method: Panel Least Squares  
Periods included: 2   
Cross-sections included: 1689  
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 3295 
White cross-section standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.063247 0.010210 6.194716 0.0000 
RD 9.47E-07 3.56E-07 2.662761 0.0078 
CAPEX 4.84E-06 1.28E-07 37.79535 0.0000 
DIV -1.57E-06 3.81E-07 -4.133700 0.0000 
MB 0.000244 5.44E-05 4.477129 0.0000 
SIZE 4.572419 0.281383 16.24980 0.0000 
BETA 0.001011 0.008090 0.124988 0.9005 
     
      Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.208102     Mean dependent var 0.089982 
Adjusted R-squared 0.206415     S.D. dependent var 0.402364 
S.E. of regression 0.358440     Akaike info criterion 0.788312 
Sum squared resid 422.3104     Schwarz criterion 0.803123 
Log likelihood -1290.744     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.793614 
F-statistic 123.3978     Durbin-Watson stat 2.069001 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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The optimal way to increase cash 
holdings 
Now that the dust has finally begun to 
settle after the 2007 financial crisis it is, 
for many corporate managers, time to 
analyze the results. "What went so 
horribly wrong?", "Could we have done 
anything differently?", "Would it have 
changed the end-result?". These are 
only a few, among many, of the 
questions that will surely occupy many 
minds in the fields of financial 
management and research for years to 
come.  However, two students have 
begun this analysis by looking into 
corporate cash holding decisions before, 
during and after the 2007 financial 
crisis, and more importantly, how these 
were perceived by the investors. More 
precisely; What is the optimal way to 
increase cash holdings, from a market 
perspective?                                                  
At the end of 2007 the world's financial 
markets were hit by the worst crisis since 
the great depression. When the US housing 
bubble eventually burst in 2007 it created 
an uncertainty on the global markets that 
limited borrowing and made the capital 
markets inaccessible. The mistrust between 
banks created a credit crunch that would 
limit the ability for firms to finance their 
operations, as well as limit consumers’ 
ability to purchase products on credit. 
Suddenly no one had any money to spend. 
To understand why Ramin Khadem and 
Patrik Petterssons thesis; The optimal way 
to increase cash holdings: From a market 
perspective, is so important, we first need 
to understand the importance of corporate 
cash holdings in different economic 
conditions. There are several reasons for a 
firm to hold cash and other liquid assets, 
among others there are transaction-, 
precautionary- and agency cost motives. 
Cash can also work as a powerful signaling 
tool to potential investors or creditors. The 
optimal level of cash holdings is a hard one 
to define. Too much and the firm will be 
punished by the opportunity cost of 
holding cash, too little and they will surely 
be punished by various costs, so called 
"Financial distress costs", that occur when 
the market believes the firm will have 
trouble financing their operations and 
obligations. Throw in the impact from 
different economic conditions (so called 
booms and busts) and you quickly realize 
that the corporate cash holding decision is 
a tough one.  
Did firms increase cash? 
In economic boom times the opportunity 
cost of holding cash is quite high, there 
will probably be plenty more profitable 
investments to use the cash for than 
keeping it safe "under the mattress". 
However in busts, or times of financial 
crisis, the potential for financial distress 
costs rise due to higher market volatility 
and difficulties for firms to reach external 
financing. Even though Mikhail Simutin 
concludes in his 2010 research that the 
stocks of cash rich firms actually 
underperform compared to stocks of cash 
poor firms, there seems to be a notion 
among corporate managers that "cash is 
good" in times of financial difficulties. 
"Like many before us we can see strong 
Time of crisis; Dec 2007 - Jun 2009 
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signs among the 1701 US firms in our 
sample that they indeed increased their 
cash holdings during and after the 2007 
financial crisis", says Patrik Pettersson.  
However the main objective of their thesis 
is not to examine whether cash holdings 
are value creating or not. With the proof 
that the firms indeed increase their cash 
holdings during and after a financial crisis, 
they were able to move on to the next 
question; where does the money come 
from? "Researchers like Kyojik Song and 
Youngjoo Lee had already concluded that 
East-Asian firms increased their cash-
holdings on behalf of investments in 
capital expenditures (CAPEX). We wanted 
to broaden this analysis by including 
research and development (R&D) 
investments as well as dividend payments 
in our research. As a last step we also 
wanted to find out how the investors 
reacted to reductions in these expenses. 
Basically, we asked ourselves; Can we find 
the, from the investors point of view, 
optimal way to increase cash holdings 
during different economic conditions?", 
says Ramin Khadem.  
Their thesis consists of three steps. In the 
first step they come to the above 
mentioned results, that the sample firms 
increased their excess cash holdings during 
and after the crisis, while at the same time 
decreasing their R&D, CAPEX and 
dividend payouts. They also found out that 
the financial leverage was kept at a stable 
level throughout all periods, meaning that 
the increase in cash holdings was not a 
result of a sudden influx of external capital 
from creditors. In the second step they go 
on to find out the connection between 
excess cash holdings and the three 
analyzed items; R&D-ratio, CAPEX-ratio 
and Dividend-ratio in the three specified 
periods. “We made a total of nine panel 
regressions in step two that showed some 
interesting results. The impact on the R&D 
expenses went from positive in the pre-
crisis period (meaning that the more excess 
cash the firm has the more they spend in 
research and development), to negative 
post-crisis (meaning the opposite, that the 
firm instead decrease their R&D expenses 
the more excess cash they hold). While the 
findings for the Dividend-ratio were not 
significant enough in the pre-crisis for us 
to draw any conclusions, comparing the 
variables in the crisis period to the post-
crisis period showed the same results as in 
the R&D-regression; that the impact from 
excess cash became negative after the 
crisis. The excess cash had a negative 
impact on CAPEX-ratio in all three 
measured periods.” says Patrik.  
Which expenses to cut? 
These findings strengthened their initial 
believes; that the increased excess cash 
holdings found in step one were 
accomplished by reductions in CAPEX, 
R&D and dividends. Now they could turn 
to the final and most important question; 
what is the, from the markets perspective, 
optimal way to increase cash holdings 
during and after the crisis. “First we had to 
perform three panel regressions, one for 
each period, to find the impact from the 
three main variables (changes in R&D, 
CAPEX and Dividends) on the firms’ 
market values. The market value tells us 
what the investors think of the company's 
performance and so for example a positive 
correlation between R&D and market 
value would mean that the investors don't 
like to see a reduction in this variable in 
this specific period. The more negative the 
correlation is, the more positive the 
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investors are to a reduction in the item.” 
says Ramin.  
After performing the regressions it became 
clear that the dividend ratio had a negative 
impact on the firms’ market values 
throughout all periods, meaning that the 
market always prefers a reduction in this 
variable. During the crisis all variables had 
a negative impact on the market value, 
telling us that the market prefers a 
conservative expenditure policy during 
times of high volatility, and that the 
positive implications of holding cash, far 
outweighs the negative ones for investing 
less. After the crisis the CAPEX-ratio 
changes from having the most negative 
impact on market value 
during the crisis, to having 
the most positive impact 
after the crisis. R&D also 
becomes positive in the 
post-crisis period. "If a non 
dividend paying firm, for 
some reason, needed to 
increase cash in the post-
crisis period they would be 
better off reducing R&D 
before CAPEX", says 
Patrik.  
Finally they also divided 
the companies into eight different clusters 
depending on their reductions/increases in 
expenses during the period. The clusters 
performance were then measured as 
changes in market value during the period 
to see which one was the best performing 
clusters during the three specified periods. 
“We came to rather similar conclusions as 
we did in the regressions for step three. For 
example, we were able to see that during 
the crisis the best performing clusters of 
firms were those that reduced either two or 
three categories of expenses. We also 
found out that large, mature firms were 
possibly more reluctant to reduce dividend 
payouts.”, says Patrik.  
The cash holding decision is an important 
but difficult one. Most firms are sometimes 
forced to increase their cash holdings 
during times of severe financial crisis. 
Thanks to Ramin Khadem and Patrik 
Pettersson, the managers of those firms 
now have some new studies to rely on 
when making those decisions.   
Authors: Ramin Khadem and Patrik 
Pettersson  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is not always an easy task to decide what the "non-essentials" really are 
